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     In this dissertation I examine sources of growth in the formal manufacturing sector 
in India, from 1970 to 2003. I consider both all-India trends and state-level trends in 
the growth of resource efficiency, measured by TFP, and the relative contribution of 
TFP growth to output growth in manufacturing, as compared to capital accumulation. 
At the state level, I also examine the relationship between per-capita income and 
trends in output per worker and TFP in the manufactring sector. Finally, in a spatial 
econometric framework, I test for the presence and magnitude of network spillovers 
from infrastructure, including national and state highways, and electricity generation 
capacity, on manufacturing TFP levels across states.  
 
  
     My work contributes to an on-going debate on the response of manufacturing 
sector TFP to the implementation of economic reforms in India, in the 1980s and 
1990s. At the regional level, this dissertation addresses not only the literature on the 
causes behind rising income inequality across states, but also on the role of 
infrastructure on regional growth, restricting atten ion to the manufacturing sector. 
 
     The results of this dissertation show that at the all-India level and at the state level, 
manufacturing sector TFP growth accelerated in India during periods of economic 
reform. The contribution of TFP growth to output growth increased in the 1990s 
relative to earlier periods, and exceeded the contribution of capital accumulation. At 
the state level, I find evidence of convergence in growth rates of output per worker 
and TFP in manufacturing. I do not find evidence of a significant correlation between 
output per worker in manufacturing and state per-capita incomes. Given the relatively 
small share of the manufacturing sector in state GDP on average, these results imply 
that the source of rising income inequalities across states may not be manufacturing.  
Finally, I find some evidence to suggest that there exist positive network spillovers 
from physical infrastructure on manufacturing sector TFP. The results suggest that 
doubling the stock of national and state highways, nd electricity generation capacity 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation examines the sources of growth in e formal1 or "registered" 
manufacturing sector in India, between 1970 and 2003.  It is an event study that 
addresses the on-going debate about the impact of eonomic reforms instituted in the 
1980s and 1990s on the efficiency of resource use (typically measured as Total Factor 
Productivity or TFP2) in the manufacturing sector.  Economic reforms coin ided with 
an acceleration of overall economic growth3, and particularly with output growth in 
the manufacturing sector, which increased from about 6 percent in the 1970s to more 
than 8 percent on average in the post-reform period.  However, there is disagreement 
in the literature about the contribution of TFP growth to this acceleration in 
manufacturing sector output growth.   
 
     The economic and policy background against which this debate is situated helps to 
place this dissertation in context and motivates its questions.  While rapid economic 
growth characterizes the overall achievement of the Indian economy in the past few 
                                                
1  The formal sector refers to firms to that are registered under the Factories Act of 
1948 and are subject to reporting requirements. For this reason, this sector is often 
referred to as the "registered" manufacturing sector. F r the purpose of this 




2  TFP is identified with the Solow residual, and is typically measured as the excess of 
value added growth over the income-share weighted growth rate of primary inputs. 
 
 
3  The growth rate of GDP increased from about 3 percent per year in the 1970s, to 




years, the issue that is central in the minds of policy makers is sustainable growth.  
The latest budget document for the fiscal year 2010-1  states early in its preamble 
that the “first” economic goal is to sustain a growth rate of over 9 percent per year or 
higher, over the medium term4.  Considering that the incidence of poverty is still very 
high in India5, sustained high growth rates would play a crucial role in bringing down 
poverty in India, and for overall development.  The budget document also highlights 
the “second” economic goal of inclusive growth.  In various forms, the goal of 
inclusive growth has been a consistent feature of Indian development policy.  This 
goal is often articulated in the form of balanced rgional growth, a central tenet of 
development policy right from the first Five Year Plan for the years 1951-19566.  In 
the achievement of these objectives, namely sustained high growth balanced across 
regions, Indian policy makers have emphasized the importance of the manufacturing 
sector at various points, and physical infrastructure is understood to be a critical input 
in this regard (as discussed briefly below).  
 
     This forms the policy backdrop against which the questions and findings of this 
                                                
4  http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2010-11/bs/speecha.htm 
 
5  Estimates range from a low of 28.3 percent for 2004- 5 as estimated by the 
Planning Commission to a significantly higher 37.2 percent estimated recently by the 
Suresh Tendulkar committee. There is a lively recent d bate on the various poverty 
estimates due to their implications especially for food security policy. 
http://www.livemint.com/2009/12/13213528/The-poverty-estimates-debate.html 
 
6  The Plan states that “[T]he need for attaining a rate of investment ... which could 
form the basis of more rapid advances in the following years and lay the foundation 
for balanced regional development in the next planning period has been an important 




dissertation may be interpreted.  The need for sustainable growth raises the question 
of how it may be achieved, and for this purpose, sorting out sources of growth is 
important from a development policy point of view.  If output and income (in growth 
and level terms) are driven by TFP, this suggests a policy response that encourages 
innovation and diffusion of new technologies, whereas factor accumulation led 
growth suggests policies aimed at raising the rate of savings and investment.  
Secondly, if capital is subject to diminishing returns and innovation-led growth is not, 
this has implications for the sustainability of growth in the long run.  Efficiency 
growth may serve as the engine that drives sustained growth rates.  However, this 
requires appropriate policies that may serve to accelerate the creation and diffusion of 
new ideas and innovations that can drive efficiency growth.  In this regard, India 
experienced economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that paved the way for a 
transition from a state-led growth model to a market oriented model.  In conjunction 
with the observed acceleration in economic growth, this has led to an examination of 
whether economic reforms were coincidental with acceleration in output and 
efficiency growth, in particular within the manufacturing sector.  
 
     On this issue, the debate on TFP growth in Indian manufacturing has largely been 
inconclusive.  I re-examine this issue with methodol gical improvements in price 
measurement, and make use of a longer time series on manufacturing sector 
aggregates, that takes into several years into the post-1991 reform period.  As a result 
of these efforts, I find that TFP growth in manufacturing indeed accelerated in the 




manufacturing output growth also increased. 
 
     These results on TFP growth acquire importance wh n viewed against the 
literature examining cross-country sources.  A growing body of evidence suggests 
that TFP is an important determinant of levels of development across countries, 
which justifies our focus.  Hall and Jones (1999) find that the correlation between 
levels of TFP and output per worker (closely related to per-capita income) was 0.9, 
and that differences in TFP explain the major share of the difference in output per 
worker between the richest and poorest countries7.  Klenow and Rodriquez-Clare 
(1997) show that more than half the difference in per-capita income levels and growth 
rates can be attributed to differences in TFP.  More recently, Hulten and Isaksson 
(2007) show that differences in relative levels of TFP are the dominant factor 
accounting for differences in income per capita.  They also find that TFP growth 
accounted for more than half the growth in output per worker in the Newly 
Industrialized Economies (NIEs) and other emerging Asian economies including 
India.  This evidence contrasts the empirical findings of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992), and Allwyn Young (1995) that suggested capital accumulation as the main 
sources of growth8.  
                                                
7  Hall and Jones find that output per worker was more than 30 times higher in the 
five countries with the highest levels of output per worker than in the five countries 
with the lowest levels. Of this difference, a factor of more than eight was attributable 
to TFP, and about two for both capital intensity and capital per worker, which 
explains the rest of the difference. 
 
 
8  In this context, it is interesting to note that Hseih (1999) did not find declining rates 





     This study focuses to the manufacturing sector on account of the importance that 
has consistently been attached to it in India's development policy, despite its 
relatively small share in GDP9.  The stated intention of policy makers and chambers 
of commerce to raise the share of manufacturing in GDP to 25 percent in the next few 
years signals this emphasis10.  Limiting this analysis to the registered sector (as 
opposed to the entire manufacturing sector, which in ludes the informal/unregistered 
sector) is motivated by considerations of data.  As the registered sector is subject to 
reporting requirements, a consistent time series on inputs and output are available, 
whereas data for the informal sector can problematic.  In terms of coverage, 
registered manufacturing accounted for about 84 percent of total inputs, 82 percent of 
gross output, and 76 percent of gross value added in the entire manufacturing sector 
in 1999-00 (Ray 2004)11.  The registered sector is not a major source of employment; 
the informal sector employs the major share of the total industrial workforce12.  
                                                                                                                                 
evidence if growth in these countries was indeed driven by capital accumulation as 
suggested by Young (1995). 
 
 
9  About 17 percent of GDP, compared with 27 percent in Korea, and 43 percent in 
China (nominal terms). 
 
 
10  http://machinist.in/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1237&Itemid=2 
 
 
11  Ray uses ASI data for 1999-00 and National Sample Survey (NSS-56th Round) 
data for 2000-01. Note that Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2007) place the share of 
organized manufacturing in sector GDP at 60 percent, not 76 percent as in the above 
study. 
 





     The all-India level growth-decomposition exercise facilitates comparison with the 
extensive literature on the timing of growth in registered manufacturing.  In addition 
to this, I extend the sources of growth framework t the regional (state) level13.  This 
extension is motivated by the sustained emphasis on balanced regional growth in 
Indian development policy.  The second Five Year Pln (1956-61) had, among others, 
the following main objectives – (i) growth led by rapid industrialization especially in 
basic and heavy industries and (ii) reduction in income inequalities and even spread 
of economic power, which was articulated in the form of balanced regional growth14.   
 
     However, despite several years of emphasis on these objectives (extending up to 
the Eleventh Plan that is currently in sway) income inequalities have increased across 
Indian states.  Figure 1 shows that the Gini coeffici nt for per capita state domestic 
                                                                                                                                 
employment is in the unregistered sector. 
 
 
13  The all-India aggregates for formal manufacturing sector used in this study are 
constructed from state-level series, as the sum of 17 major states, that account for 98 
percent of the formal manufacturing sector. 
 
 
14  In early years of development planning, balanced regional growth was pursued 
through both state-led investment in industries as well as regulation/restrictions 
imposed on private activity, and through fiscal inducements. However, post-reform 
strategies place emphasis on private sector investment, and balanced growth 
objectives are articulated through policies such as establishment of Special Economic 
Zones (equivalent to the Export Processing Zones in Chi a), whereby the state 





product has increased over time, according to Planning Commission estimates15.  
Moreover, the level of penetration of the manufacturing sector in state GDP is on 
average only around 12 percent, with most states falling below the average (Table 1). 
   
     Against this backdrop, this study inquires into the role of the manufacturing sector 
with regard to regional income inequality.  It focuses on convergence across states in 
growth rates of output per worker as well as TFP, and examines whether these 
productivity measures have any relationship with per-capita state incomes.  The 
results of this study show that there is indeed convergence in the growth rates of 
output per worker and TFP growth across states, especially in the 1980s and also in 
the 1990s.  In the case of TFP growth, again convergence is observed strongly in the 
1980s, whereas in the 1990s it appears that TFP growth rates across groups of states 
are very similar if not identical.  
  
     However, there is little correlation between a st te's rank in terms of income per 
capita and its rank in manufacturing output per worker, indicating that the 
manufacturing sector has had little impact on income levels in states.  Perhaps this is 
driven by the relatively low penetration of manufacturing in state economies.  While I 
do find a positive correlation between TFP levels and per-capita income, I do not take 
this to indicate the effect of differences in manufacturing sector TFP levels across 
states on relative state incomes.  TFP may well be influenced by levels of 
development, through the impact of income on health, education, and other 
                                                




environmental factors that are not directly related to the inputs and outputs of the 
manufacturing sector.  In other words, the causation may run from income to TFP 
rather than vice-versa.  
 
     An important conclusion from the findings on regional growth in manufacturing is 
that if one is to examine the causes for widening income inequalities across states, 
then one may have to look at other sectors, namely agriculture and services, in order 
to explain the causes for divergent levels of income per capita.  The results show that 
levels of output per worker do not correlate with state per-capita income levels, and 
growth rates of output per worker have converged.  Further, given the low penetration 
of manufacturing in state GDP, it is unlikely that income inequalities have widened 
on account of the manufacturing sector.  
 
     In addition to the focus on regional inequalities, I also examine in parallel the 
contribution of TFP growth to state manufacturing sector output growth, relative to 
the contribution of inputs.  This addresses the issue of sustainable growth, for even if 
manufacturing is currently small as a proportion of the state economy, its role is 
envisaged to expand, as mentioned above.  I find that w ile TFP growth had 
relatively little role to play in the convergence of output per worker growth, its 
contribution to output per worker has indeed increased over time, and is now larger 






     In the final part of this dissertation, I examine the impact of infrastructure 
provision on state manufacturing TFP levels in an econometric framework.  
Infrastructure provision is an important policy problem especially in India.  Not only 
is it recognized as a bottleneck to high growth rates, in the context of balanced 
regional growth, infrastructure has consistently found a place of high importance 
development policy.  In this regard, it is noteworthy hat the 1st Five Year Plan 
(1951-56) recognized that in the absence of adequat ancillary services and social 
overhead capital, it would be difficult to woo investment to relatively less 
industrialized locations16.  
 
     More generally, infrastructure is considered to be a critical input for development 
of the manufacturing sector.  In the words of Albert Hi schman, private production 
activities cannot be undertaken without social overhead capital (infrastructure), 
including physical infrastructure such as roads and electricity, and services such as 
water, communications, public administration, education, and health.  He assigns 
transportation and energy infrastructure to the "hard core of the concept" of social 
overhead capital, as "[I]t is widely assumed that enlarged availabilities of electric 
power and transportation facilities are essential preconditions for economic 
development practically everywhere." 
 
 
                                                







     Not only does infrastructure have a role as a direct input in private production, but 
it may contribute to output growth via spillover benefits, over and above its 
contribution to growth as an input.  To illustrate what is meant by such spillovers, 
take the case of physical infrastructure like roads17.  Roads are a direct input for the 
transportation industry, when combined with trucks and drivers, produce transport 
services, which firms pay for, in effect paying forthe infrastructure indirectly as 
embedded in the transportation services consumed by firms.  In addition, good road 
networks may reduce travel time for all firms, as well as wear and tear on transport 
equipment, and help promote better inventory management, which may increase 
resource use efficiency for firms.  Similarly, regular and high quality electricity may 
promote introduction of new technologies that require reliable power supplies, again 
increasing efficiency.   
 
     Moreover, physical infrastructure is often a sp tial network, and a reduction in 
congestion in one state (due to an improvement in the s ock of infrastructure within 
that state), may also reduce congestion in an adjoining state since road networks and 
traffic flow are linked spatially.  Stated another way, a state may derive spillover 
benefits from the infrastructure stock of its neighbours.  We may term these kind of 
benefits from infrastructure as “network spillovers”, which could be “own” spillovers 
when a state’s own stock of infrastructure increases ( ay) manufacturing output 
within that state, or “spatial” spillovers when outp  growth is impacted by changes in 
infrastructure stock and/or quality in adjoining states.  It is these types of spillovers 
                                                




that are captured by TFP (for the registered manufact ring sector) whose presence we 
seek to establish.   
 
     Two points are worth emphasizing here.  Firstly, the type of network effect whose 
presence we seek to establish are pure spillovers, over and above the contribution to 
growth (in registered manufacturing output) via infrastructure’s role as an 
intermediate input.  This should be kept in mind when interpreting the magnitudes of 
elasticities (of output to infrastructure stock) that we find in this study.  Secondly, the 
effects, such as we do find here, only pertain to spillovers accruing to registered 
manufacturing, they exclude any such benefits that may accrue from infrastructure to 
any other sector in the economy.  
 
     If spillovers of this nature are significant, this has implications for infrastructure 
policy.  Given the special characteristics of infrast ucture goods, determining the 
existence and magnitude of infrastructure spillovers can be a useful exercise.  
Infrastructure goods are typically in the nature of public goods or club goods, 
provided outside the market mechanism through governm nt spending.  For goods 
provided through the market mechanism, it is believd that the private and social 
marginal benefits are equated, and the price reflects the entire benefit from the good.  
On the other hand, infrastructure goods are typically provided on a cost-benefit basis, 
and if significant network spillovers are not accounted for, the direct rate of return 
may understate the total benefit, leading to under-provision.  Especially in the 




regional infrastructure provision are made.  
 
     The literature on infrastructure spillovers on growth is marked by considerable 
debate, with estimates ranging from very high, such as Aschauer's (1989) estimates 
for the US, to faint or non-existent.  Also, the results are mixed in a cross-country 
setting; we refer the reader to Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of this literature.  
Based on the empirical analysis presented here, there appears to be some evidence of 
spillovers from highways and electricity infrastruct re in Indian states.  
 
     In this study I use the growth accounting methodology incorporating infrastructure 
spillovers developed by Hulten and Schwab (1991), and applied to Indian 
manufacturing sector data in Hulten, Bennathan and Srinivasan (2006), hereafter 
referred to as HBS.  The main contributions of thisstudy are as follows.  Firstly, I 
extend the time period of the HBS study to take into account several years of data in 
the important post-1991 economic reform period.  The HBS study extends from 1973 
to 1993, which leaves an opportunity to explore in more depth what happened to 
manufacturing sector growth several years into the second wave of economic reforms.  
Secondly, I expend considerable effort to address the issue of price deflation, as it is 
clear from the literature that different assumptions about underlying prices can lead to 
qualitatively very different results on sources of growth, thus making it difficult to 
draw conclusions about the pattern of TFP growth in Indian manufacturing.  The 
reader is referred to an extensive discussion of the methodology employed to 




Appendix.  Finally, I extend the work done by HBS in studying network spillovers 
from infrastructure on manufacturing sector growth, by implementing spatial 
econometric techniques developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999), that allow us 
to test not only for the presence of own spillovers and spatial spillovers.  To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first such application of spatial econometric techniques 




     India is an important country to study from a development perspective, given that 
despite rapid economic growth, it still houses a third of the world's poorest, and ranks 
122nd in the world on per-capita income.  As a case study, its regions are 
heterogeneous in terms of geography, ethnicity, and socio-economic structure, but at 
the same time share common institutional features and statistical systems, that render 
it relatively free of problems that make comparisons a d interpretation difficult in a 
cross-country setting.  Thus, India is sufficiently large and diverse, and at the same 
time homogenous to the extent that may allow the findings of such a study to have 
some general validity (HBS 2006).  
 
     India also underwent a shift in its approach to development policy, over a period 
that falls within the time-frame of this study.  Inthe early years of post-Independence 
development policy, the main vehicle for implementing development strategies was 




domestic capacity in heavy industries, as documented i  the Second Plan (1956-7 to 
1960-1), also known as the Nehru-Mahalonobis plan after its main architects.  The 
Plan also placed emphasis on balanced regional growth that was to be pursued both 
through incentives and through restrictions on industrial scale and location.  This 
period was characterized by strong presence of the stat in production activities, 
directly through state owned enterprises and indirectly through industrial licensing, 
quotas and permits, and import controls, all of which combined to restrict the scope of 
activity in the private sector.  On account of the restrictive nature of controls, this 
period is often referred to as the License-Quota-Permit Raj, evoking British colonial 
rule in India.  
 
     Subsequently, economic reforms were initiated in the 1980s, largely aimed at the 
manufacturing sector, involving partial de-licensing and deregulation of industries, 
along with a measure of import liberalization18.  These were followed by another 
wave of reforms, after a balance of payments crisis in 1990-91, in which virtually all 
manufacturing industries were de-licensed, along with further relaxation of controls 
on imports of capital goods and inflows of foreign direct investment.  Conventional 
wisdom suggests that freeing up the private sector would results in absorption of new 
technologies through imports, and encourage innovati n spurred by fewer entry 
                                                
18  Ahluwalia (1991) noted that: "[T]he most important changes have related to 
reducing the domestic barriers to entry and expansion to inject a measure of 
competition in domestic industry, simplifying the procedures, and providing easier 
access to better technology and intermediate material imports as well as more 
flexibility in the use of installed capacity with a view to enabling easier supply 






restrictions, which would be captured in higher TFP.  The results on the timing of 
TFP growth thus provide indirect evidence on the efficacy of market-oriented reforms 
in India.  
 
     To summarize, this dissertation consists of 3 inter-related sections.  The first 
section is a sources of growth analysis of the regist red manufacturing sector at the 
all-India level.  The second section carries this analysis to the state level, and also 
examines the relationship between output per worker and TFP in manufacturing and 
per capita state incomes.  The final section looks at a policy issue, namely 
infrastructure provision, and tries to ascertain the presence and magnitude of network 
spillovers from infrastructure on state level manufacturing growth, in a spatial 
econometric framework.  
 
     The plan of this study is as follows.  In Chapter 2, I review the literature on the 
three central questions of this dissertation.  In Chapter 3, I undertake the sources of 
growth decomposition, laying out the model, describing the data, and discussing the 
all-India and state level results.  Chapter 4 is devot d to network spillovers from 
infrastructure.  This section includes data description and preliminary explorations, a 
description of the econometric model, and a discussion and interpretation of the 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1.  Sources of growth in all-India manufacturing 
 
     Table 2 summarizes various results on trends i TFP growth (TFPG) in registered 
manufacturing, especially whether the acceleration (if any) coincided with economic 
reforms.  Evidently the literature is not conclusive.  Ahluwalia (1991) was one of the 
first to document a turn-around in TFPG from negative o positive in the 1980s, 
which she attributed to liberalization policies.  Similar evidence of a turn-around was 
found by Dholakia and Dholakia (1994).  However, Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan 
(1994) – hereafter referred to as B-P – pointed out methodological problems in 
Ahluwalia's procedure, and using an alternative procedure of estimating real value 
added19, showed that TFP growth in manufacturing decelerated in the 1980s, a result 
which stood at odds with the liberalization efforts of the day.  
                                                
19  The debate over deflation methodology is really a debate over pricing intermediate 
inputs when estimating real value added from gross output data. In "single deflation", 
both gross output and intermediate input prices are assumed to grow at the same rate. 
But if intermediate input prices grow faster than output prices, real value added 
growth is under-estimated relative to its true rate( nd vice-versa if intermediate input 
prices grow slower than output prices. B-P (1994) showed that output and input prices 
growth often diverge in the data. They adopted an alternative procedure known as 
double deflation, whereby gross output and gross intermediate inputs are separately 
deflated by two different price indices. The latter has to be constructed from several 
input price indices, to reflect the basket of interm diate inputs used by the 
manufacturing sector. They thus used input-output data on commodity flows to 
intermediate input consumption in the manufacturing sector for 1973-74, and derived 
a set of weights with which to combine intermediate commodity's price series into an 
aggregate intermediate price index, which was then used to estimate real intermediate 








     Since both the Ahluwalia and B-P procedure for estimating TFPG is potentially 
biased, Rao (1996) used the Tornqvist-Divisia procedur  for estimating the 
productivity residual based on the Solow-Jorgenson-Griliches growth model that at 
the sectoral level, takes the form of a "KLEMS" model, an acronym for capital-
labour-energy-materials-services.  We refer to this measure as "total productivity" or 
TP, to distinguish it from the TFP concept that is ba ed on value added and is suitable 
to analyze the aggregate economy20.  TP is derived as the income share-weighted 
difference in real gross output growth and the growth rate of real primary and 
intermediate inputs, which includes energy, materials, and services.  Unlike the value-
added based model, productivity changes impact not o ly primary inputs, but also 
intermediate inputs in the KLEMS framework.  This feature of the model makes it 
particularly suitable in the context of developing countries, where shocks to 
intermediate inputs can impact manufacturing output.  Hence, economies from 
intermediate inputs may be a significant source of pr ductivity growth.  Using this 
framework, Rao also finds that TP growth decelerated in the 1980s.  
                                                
20  At the level of aggregate economy, the consumption of intermediate goods is equal 
to their output, and thus intermediate flows cancel out. From the national income 
accounting identity, GDP equals gross domestic income (GDI), which equals the 
income of labour and capital. Hence TFP, which measures the excess of real value 
added growth over the income-share weighted growth f primary inputs, is 
appropriate at the level of the aggregate economy. However, at the industry/sector 
level, it is not necessary that purchases of intermediate inputs equal to sales of 
intermediate outputs. Thus the appropriate underlying production is a gross output 
function that includes intermediate inputs. Moreover, the efficiency parameter in the 
gross-output framework is typically modeled as augmenting not only primary inputs 
but also intermediate inputs, which can also be a significant source of efficiency. For 







     A feature of both B-P (1994) and Rao (1996) is that their intermediate input price 
deflator uses fixed base weights, derived from one si gle year of input-output 
information for the Indian economy21.  This is equivalent to a fixed-base weighting 
scheme, and thus subject to the criticisms that apply to such indices.  Specifically, 
fixed weights derived from only one year of information on the flow of goods may 
miss out on changes in the underlying structure of inputs and outputs over time.  To 
get around this problem, using state-level manufactring data, HBS (2006) 
constructed a price deflator that varies by time and state22, and find that TP growth 
remained more or less unchanged in the pre and post-ref rms periods.  
 
     Hence, the spectrum of results covers acceleration, stagnation, and deceleration in 
manufacturing TFP in the 1980s relative to the 1970s and earlier.  A big boost to 
liberalization efforts came in 1991, in the wake of a balance of payments crisis, 
leading to a bigger push towards market oriented economic policies, including 
widespread de-licensing and deregulation of industry, and further liberalization of the 
current account.  A fresh literature emerged re-examining the timing of growth 
                                                
21  Input-output tables for the Indian economy are generally available every five 
years, starting from 1973-74. 
 
 
22  They derive implicit input prices at the 2-digit industry group level by assuming 
that within each industry group, the ratio of real input to real output is constant, and 
given this constant and the price of output, the implicit price of intermediate inputs at 
each industry group level can be determined, and aggregated to the all-manufacturing 







question, and again, while new methodological issue came to light, the results as to 
trends in productivity growth in manufacturing were inconclusive.  For example, 
Unel (2003) uses the value added framework and finds manufacturing TFP growth to 
have accelerated in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.  On the other, Goldar (2007), 
and Banga and Goldar (2007), using the gross output framework, find the opposite 
trend.  Notwithstanding the mixed results, the potential importance of the role of 
services as an intermediate input was brought to light as a methodological issue.  In 
previous studies, services prices were not included in measures of intermediate input 
prices, but over time, services have gained in importance as intermediate inputs, and 
therefore pricing intermediate inputs accurately requires that the weight of services be 
factored in.  Banga and Goldar (2007) show that if the contribution of services is not 
taken into account, this leads to an overstatement of productivity growth in the post-
1990s period, perhaps on account of the faster growth f services-use in the 1990s 
relative to the 1980s.  
 
     The results discussed above are confined to the registered or formal sector within 
manufacturing, consisting of firms registered under th  Factories Act of 1948, which 
are subject to reporting requirements.  Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2007) point 
out that although this sector accounted for 60 percent of manufacturing output in 
1999-00, bulk of manufacturing sector employment lies within the unorganized or 
informal sector, accounting for as high as 98 percent of manufacturing employment.  
For the manufacturing sector as a whole (including both registered and unregistered 




the 20 years prior.  They also find TFPG slowed down in the 1990s, though it picked 
up again after 199923.  
 
     Taken as a whole, the literature on All-India m nufacturing TFPG is not 
conclusive about trends in the post reform period.  However, it identifies a variety of 
issues that need to be addressed while estimating TFP growth, as highlighted above.  
In this study, we synthesize the lessons from the li erature in a number of ways.  
Firstly, we adopt the Tornqvist-Divisia (T-D) index numbers procedure for estimating 
TP growth based on a gross output framework that includes intermediate inputs, and 
allows the productivity parameter to enhance all inputs, including intermediate inputs.  
Our use of this framework helps to guard against the biases that may creep into TFPG 
estimates due to single or double deflation.  Secondly, we adopt a flexible weighting 
strategy for pricing intermediate inputs, and deriv the weights by using several years 
of commodity-flows information for the Indian industrial sector.  Thirdly, we 
incorporate the services sector in a KLEMS model, in view of its increasingly 
important role as an input.  The methodology is described in more detail in Chapter 3 
as well as the Appendix.  
 
                                                
23  Bosworth et. al. (2007) assume fixed shares for capital and labour in value added, 
according to proportions that are observed in OECD countries (60:40 share for labour 
and capital respectively). This is important, since th  growth rates of capital and 
labour may differ significantly in different periods, the choice of factor shares can 
have a strong influence on measured TFPG. Their choce may be justified owing to 
their coverage of both the organized and unorganized sector, as reliable data are 
difficult to find for the latter. In our case, we do not make this fixed shares 
assumption, since we deal only with registered manufact ring, which presumably has 




2.2.  Regional growth and infrastructure 
 
     Given the variation in regional development levels, development plans have 
consistently emphasized balanced regional growth24, and industrialization was given 
an important role in this objective.  Prior to liberalization, industrial location policies 
were pursued with a combination of fiscal incentives to industrialize so-called 
"backward" areas, and industrial licensing and quota restrictions that prevented 
already industrialized regions from entering markets and expanding scale freely.  
Over time, it was recognized that this approach might be detrimental to overall 
growth, as articulated in the Sixth Plan (1980-85): “[I]t should be generally accepted 
that the fulfillment of the objective [of balanced regional growth] required upgrading 
the development process in backward regions rather than curtailing the growth of 
these regions that have acquired a certain momentum.”  Current planning strategies 
have evolved considerably, now emphasizing inter-state competition for investment, 
and improvement in governance to create an enabling climate for industrialization25.  
 
     Despite the focus on balanced growth, and notwithstanding the shift in strategy, 
regional income inequalities have widened in the post-reform era, as acknowledged in 
the current (Eleventh) Plan.  This has raised concerns that the shift in approach to 
                                                
24  This objective finds mention in virtually all Five Year Plans. See Balanced 
Regional Development in India - Issues and Policies, Anita Kumar (ed.), 2006, for 
excerpts on balanced regional growth policies and problems, covering the First Plan 
to the Tenth Plan (spanning 1950-2007). 
 
 




regional development might contribute to widening icome inequalities.  A recent 
study by Misra (2007) focuses on inequality in the post-reform period, and finds that 
inequality in per-capita state domestic product (SDP) worsened over the 1980s and 
1990s (Gini-coefficient rising from 0.14 in 1981 to 0.18 in 1995), and after 1995 this 
gap has not narrowed.  This lends support to the rising inequality documented by the 
Planning Commission study as seen in Figure 1.  
 
     In this context, infrastructure is often identified as both a cause and a solution for 
the problem for regional income inequalities.  Testing for sigma convergence26 in 
income in Indian states, Ghosh and De (1998) found an increase in the coefficient of 
variation in state per-capita income, and a high correlation between an index of state 
infrastructure27 and per-capita income.  They also find that the position of states 
relative to national average per-capita income, and the relative position of states in 
terms of infrastructure provision has remained uncha ged over 1971-1994, implicitly 
attributing to lack of infrastructure provision, the failure of state incomes to converge.  
In another study, using state level manufacturing sector data from 1976-1992, Mitra, 
Varoudakis and Veganzones (1998) finding that infrastructure28 has a significant 
                                                




27  Constructed by principal components. 
 
 
28  Their measure is a composite indicator constructed using principle components, 
including core infrastructure, services infrastructure, and human capital. They include 
measures of electricity, roads, railways, vehicles p r capita, postal system, primary 




positive impact on TFP growth in 14 out of 18 industry groups.  HBS (2006) find 
evidence of a positive elasticity of manufacturing sector growth to highways and 
electricity generation capacity.  
 
     The interest in spillover effects from infrastructure was sparked by the finding by 
Aschauer (1989) that a one percent increase in the stock of public capital in the US 
led to a 0.4 percent increase in private output.  Based on the stock of public capital 
and value of private output, this implied that an investment of US $10 billion in 
infrastructure would produce an additional US $7 billion in GNP the following year, 
and that public capital is 4 times more productive han private capita, at the margin.  
However, Munnell (1990b) estimated the direct contribu ion of infrastructure stock to 
private output using pooled state data, and found a significant, though much smaller 
elasticity of 0.15 percent.  
 
     This difference in the aggregate and panel estimates was attributed to the presence 
of infrastructure externalities that may not be captured in state level data.  However, 
Hulten and Schwab (1984, 1991) found no evidence that regional differences in 
productivity were driven by differences in stocks of public goods;  in fact they found 
that productivity levels and growth rates were quite similar across reasons, implicitly 
ruling out any explanatory role for infrastructure.  Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) 
also found no evidence of spatial spillovers from US national highways on state level 
                                                                                                                                 






private output growth.  
 
     There is some evidence of spatial spillovers in other countries.  Pereira and Roca-
Sagales (2002) estimate a 5.5 percent rate of return to public capital at the national 
level in Spain, and a significantly positive return in 14 out of 17 Spanish regions.  
Similar to Munnel's findings about the US, they also find that the sum of regional 
estimates (based on within-region stocks on infrastructure) account for less than half 
of the total effect of public capital, as estimated at the national level.  Upon allowing 
for spatial spillovers, this sum exceeds the nationl estimate.  In cross-country data29, 
Canning and Fay (1993) estimate normal to high returns from public capital in 
industrial countries, high returns in industrializing countries, and low returns in 
under-developed countries, suggesting that countries w th relatively low 
infrastructure stocks get higher returns from additional stocks, as opposed to 
developed countries that already have dense infrastructure networks30.  
 
     The evidence on developing countries suggests there may exist sizable 
infrastructure benefits within Indian states, since India as a whole is an infrastructure-
shortage country.  However, spillovers effects such as spatial spillovers may be 
                                                
29  See Gramlich (1994) for a review of the literature. 
 
 
30  This point was earlier made by Hulten, (commenting o  Munnel 1990b), that 
"adding to an existing [infrastructure] network will rarely have the same return [as 
constructing the original network]: at the some point, the increasing returns to scale 







harder to detect.  Indian states can be quite large in terms of area and certainly in 
terms of population, comparable to the largest European countries.  For example, the 
population of one of the most industrialized states (Maharashtra) is over 96 million, 
and its land area is over 310,000 sq km.  It compares with Germany, which has a 
population of 82 million, and a land area of more than 350,000 sq km.  To put the 
problem in perspective, searching for spatial externalities across Indian states is 
equivalent to searching for them across large European countries, and it is possible 
that over such vast areas, these effects tend to diminish and may be difficult to detect.  





Chapter 3: Sources of Growth 
3.1.  Theory  
 
     We adopt a non-parametric index-number approach to measuring manufacturing 
sector efficiency31.  We implement the model developed for the US by Hulten and 
Schwab (1991), and applied to Indian manufacturing sector data by HBS (2006).  The 
model relates gross manufacturing output to primary and intermediate inputs, and a 
Hicks neutral shift parameter that captures efficien y.  This is the "KLEMS" 
framework, which is the form taken by the Solow-Jorgensen-Griliches framework for 
estimating resource efficiency as one moves from the aggregate economy to the 
sectoral level.  As mentioned earlier, we refer to the measure of resource efficiency 
derived from this model as Total Productivity or TP.  The shift parameter is modeled 
as a function of infrastructure stock32.  The production function can be written as: 
                                                
31  As opposed to assuming a specific functional form for the manufacturing sector 
production (gross output) function and estimating its parameters, we disaggregate the 
sources of growth based on the contribution of each input to real output growth. 
 
 
32  Hulten and Schwab (1991) discuss the issues and implications of this formulation 
for the role of infrastructure. In this form, infrastructure is an "environmental" factor 
that can enhance the efficiency of any or all inputs, and captures its indirect or 
spillover impact on manufacturing output growth. Infrastructure can also directly 
contribute to growth as a paid input, and should thus be an argument in the production 
function.  
 
     Suppose ),,,,()( ,,,,, titititiiti BMLKFtAQ =  and this production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale over the private inputs. Then, under the assumption of 
competitive markets where each private factor is pad its marginal product, the 









(1) ),,,(),( ,,,,, tititititi MLKFtBAQ =   
 
where tiQ ,  represents real gross output in state i  in year t , tiK ,  and tiL ,  represent 
capital and labour stocks, and tiM ,  is real intermediate inputs, including materials, 
fuels and power, and services.  )(⋅A  captures exogenous changes in efficiency that 
shift the production function, and  tiB ,  is the stock of infrastructure in state i  at time 
.t  The term also contains an independent time variable t  to capture autonomous 
technical progress.  We can give this function a specific functional form as follows: 




















⋅⋅=⋅=π . But if the production function does not 
show constant returns to scale over private inputs (e.g., it shows constant returns over 
private and public inputs), then the omission public capital leads to two sources of 
bias. The first source is the contribution of public growth to output growth, analogous 







iBtA ⋅=ε  
The second source of bias comes from the fact that the price of private capital is not 
observed, but imputed by assuming constant returns o private inputs, and ignoring 
public capital.  
 








i −−⋅=  However, the residual 
attributed to private capital's share in income also includes the share of public capital, 
as an unpaid input  )(tBi . Thus the share of private capital is over-estimated, 
introducing a bias. Note that if the production function does exhibit constant returns 
to private inputs, then this source of bias vanishes. In the case of Indian 
manufacturing, Fikkert and Hassan (1998) have shown that by and large Indian 
industry shows constant returns to scale, mitigatin our concerns of bias from this 
source. 
 
     There remains the possibility of infrastructure being a direct input into 
manufacturing. Like Hulten and Schwab (1991), I assume that the manufacturing 
sector buys intermediate inputs (services) from servic -producing sectors such as 
transportation and communications, which in turn cosume infrastructure as a direct 
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where .1=++ γβα  Hence we assume that the production function exhibits constant 
returns in the private inputs.  Taking logs, differentiating with respect to time, and 
rearranging, we obtain the Divisia index for TP growth: 














γβα   
   
     Under the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products, the elasticity 
parameters  γβα ,,  can be estimated as the share of input costs in gross output, i.e. 
,pQ
wL=α  pQ
MpM=γ   where Mp  is the price of intermediate inputs, and γαβ −−=1  is 
the share of private capital income33.  This is a continuous time index of TP growth, 
but we use its discrete time approximation known as the Tornqvist-Divisia (TD) 
index: 







π   
 
where iQ  is real gross output, jiX ,  is the level of (real) inputj  (labour, capital, and 
                                                
33  Our estimate of capital stock is a Divisia aggregat  of sub-components, based on 
ASI data on nominal investment in structure, and plant, machinery and equipment. 






intermediate inputs), and ji ,π  is the share of the jth  input in gross output, calculated 
as the average of the share in two adjacent periods34.  
 
     Let tp  and tµ  be the price of output and intermediate inputs respectively in 
periodt .  Divisia indices of real output and intermediate input growth were obtained 
as: 
 
 )],ln()[ln()]ln()[ln(ln)5( 11,1,, −−− −−−=∆ tttittitti ppQpQpQ  and 
 
 )]ln()[ln()]ln()[ln(ln)6( 11,1,, −−− −−−=∆ tttittitti MMM µµµµ   
 
     These growth rates are substituted back in (4) to obtain TP growth rates.  An index 
is then constructed by incrementing (decrementing) using these growth rates and a 
base year.  
 
     For the regional analysis, we also estimate TP levels using the procedure 
developed by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978) and generalized by Caves-
Christensen-Diewert (1982), whereby the estimated growth rates of TP are applied to 
a base year estimate of the TP level of each state, which is relative to the all-India 
                                                
34  For example, the share of labour in year t  is calculated as: 
 ][5.0 1,,, −+= tLtLtL πππ   






average level.  An estimate of the base year level is obtained as: 
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where starred variables are Divisia indices of all-India output and inputs, and jπ  is 
the arithmetic mean of the share of expenditure on input j  in state i , and the 
corresponding all- India share35.  Finally, we normalize the state-wise estimates by 
0TP , the average level in 1970, our base year.  This base year productivity relative is 
then incremented (decremented) by the TP growth rates estimated above.  
 
3.2.  Data 
 
     Data on manufacturing is taken from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) of the 
Central Statistical Organization (CSO), which covers all establishments (factories or 
units) registered under section 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act (1948).  This 
includes factories employing 10 or more workers andusing electricity, or 20 or more 
workers without electricity, on any day of the preceding 12 months.  The population 
of eligible factories is split into a census sector and a sample sector for which the 
                                                
35  This method was employed by HBS (2006). Banga and Gol ar (2007) estimated 
TP levels normalizing by geometric averages of the Divisia indices of state output 
and inputs. We also experimented with this method and found very similar results to 






sampling probability has been revised at different points in time36.  Therefore, while 
certain medium and large factories figure consistently i  different survey years, those 
in the sample sector change over time.  
 
     There have been three revisions to the industrial classification system since the 
first sample year (1970), which raises questions of data comparability across multiple 
survey rounds.  This particular data set was compiled by the EPW Research 
Foundation (EPWRF), who attempting a concordance between the various series 
(NIC 1973, NIC 1987, NIC 1998), so that series obtained using NIC 1973-74 are as 
closely comparable as possible with data from subsequent rounds, at least at the 2-
digit level.  
 
     The data for the all-India manufacturing sector were constructed by aggregating 2-
digit industries data at the state level, from 17 states37, excluding the north-eastern 
                                                
36  Until 1986-87, the census sector was defined as 50 or more workers with power, 
and 100 or more workers without power, and the sample sector as 10-49 workers with 
power, 20-99 workers without power. Firms in the former group were enumerated 
every year, while those in the latter were enumerated every other year on the basis of 
a 50 percent probability sample. 
 
     This methodology was replaced in 1987 by a newsampling method whereby any 
establishment employing in excess of 100 workers would be part of the census sector 
regardless of the use of power, whereas the rest would be part of the sample sector. 
There have been subsequent changes in the coverage of the census sector, but the 
definition of the sector as that employing more than 100 workers remains as of date. 
 
 
37  These include Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. In the 




states and other union territories that constitute a v ry small fraction of the 
manufacturing sector and do not have consistent time series data.  In addition to ASI 
data on industrial aggregates, National Accounts Statistics (NAS) data on gross fixed 
capital formation was employed for constructing a capital stock series, and data from 
the input-output Transactions Tables (IOTT) for the Indian economy were used to 
construct prices deflators.  How these additional data were used is described below.  
 
Construction of Price and Quantity Series 
 
     Price Indices: We made extensive use of input-output information for the Indian 
economy to construct price deflators for ASI manufacturing output and intermediate 
inputs respectively.  This approach builds on existing approaches for estimating real 
values of these quantities in the following ways.  
 
     Firstly, with respect to output, the price deflator is a Divisia-type price index that 
weights the wholesale price index of each 2-digit ASI commodity by its share in total 
deliveries to final demand of all ASI-covered commodities.  This is a refinement over 
using the official (CSO) wholesale price index for the aggregate manufacturing 
sector, since it excludes certain commodities (such as primary and processed primary 
goods) that are not covered by the ASI but are included in the official aggregate 
manufacturing price index.  Secondly, with respect to intermediate inputs, we follow 
                                                                                                                                 
Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir on account of issues of r liable infrastructure data 






Goldar (2004) and include services into the intermediat  inputs category, as the share 
of services in inputs has growth considerably over time as shown below.  Finally, our 
approach differs from the standard approach by using time-varying weights, making 
use of several different years of input-output information.  Between 1973-74 and 
1998-99, we consider 5 different rounds of input-output (I-O) commodity flow 
information as brought out by the Central Statistical Organization.  The details of how 
I-O information was used to devise a set of commodity-w se weights to construct the 
aggregate price deflators are contained in the Appendix, while an overview of the 
method is provided below.  In the existing literatue, when I-O information has been 
used, the typical approach has been to use a single year of commodity flows data 
from the absorption matrix to derive weights, which overlooks changes in the input 
and output mix of the industrial sector especially when considering long spans of 
more than thirty years.  The standard practice for deflating output or value added has 
been to use the overall manufacturing wholesale price index.   
 
     We construct a Divisia-type output deflator as follows.  Using I-O data over five 
survey rounds (1973-74, 1983-84, 1988-89, 1993-94, and 1998-99) we derive a series 
of time-variant weights for each commodity covered by the ASI, based on the share 
of a commodity's deliveries to final demand in total deliveries of all ASI 
commodities.  Therefore, we obtain the proportion of output in the 25 2-digit ASI 
industry-groups delivered to final demand (consumption, investment, and exports).  
The publication of import-flow matrices in the 1989 and 1993 rounds makes it 




For other survey years, this information is not avail ble, hence for years before 1989 
(and after 1993), an approximation was employed, by imposing the proportion of 
deliveries to final demand from domestic output for 1989 on domestic production 
data from 1983 and 1973, and the proportion obtained from the 1993 data to the 1998 
data.  Using this method, we are able to obtain final-demand based weights for the 
ASI output price deflator.  For years between I-O rounds, we apply linear 
interpolation.  Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the two-digit industries covered in this 
paper, their weight in total deliveries to final demand, and the WPI series closest to 
the industry group.  Figure 2 graphs the percentage difference between the official 
manufacturing and our Divisia output price deflator.  
 
     From the input-flow matrix of the I-O tables, the values of flows of 21 input 
commodities/services to ASI industries were aggregated.  Each input was then 
assigned a weight based on its share in total flows of all inputs to intermediate 
consumption by ASI industries.  Weights for years between survey rounds were 
linearly interpolated (Appendix, table A.2 shows the estimated weights for each 
input).  The use of I-O information for constructing an input deflator is common (see 
for example B-P 1994 or Rao 1996), but these studies us  a single year of I-O 
information which amounts to fixed base weights, that might overlook changes in the 
structure of inputs.  Flexible weighting guards against this.  Table A.2 shows for 
example, that primary food articles and cotton textil s have declining shares in inputs, 
while mineral oils, chemicals, electricity, and services (especially transport, banking, 




share of services in intermediate inputs has doubled ov r time.  
 
     Capital Stock: We construct an estimate of capital stock using the perpetual 














t IKK δ   
where  K   is gross capital stock,  δ   is the rate of depreciation, and  I is gross 
investment.  In our approach, we distinguish between structures (STR), and plant, 
machinery and equipment (PME), and obtain the final estimate of capital stock by 
summing the two series.  
      
     An estimate of investment in each kind of capital stock was obtained as follows.  
ASI data provides only nominal investment figures, which have to broken down into 
real investment in either kind of capital.  Using All-India National Accounts Statistics 
(NAS) data on aggregate investment (1974-1997) in PME and STR, we obtained the 
proportion of investment in PME and STR respectively by the public, private 
corporate and household sector.  Since ASI data on investment is available by 
ownership, we apply the proportions by type of investment and type of ownership 
obtained from NAS data to the ASI series on investmnt by ownership, and add up 
the weights for each type of investment to obtain a fi l set of annual weights for 
splitting ASI nominal investment into investment in PME and STR (see Table A.4 in 
the Appendix).  Based on NAS data, on average about 60 percent of nominal 




1997.  These averages were used as weights for years prio  to 1974 and after 199738.  
 
     Using these nominal series, Divisia growth rates of real investment in PME and 
STR were obtained separately, using the Electrical and Industrial Machinery WPI and 
Construction GDP deflator respectively, and applied to base-year level of stock to 
obtain our estimates of real investment.  The base year stock was set at the deflated 
book value of gross PME and STR stock in 1970.  Applying a depreciation rate of 3 
percent for structures, and 15 percent for equipment, the aggregate capital stock series 
















t IKK δ  where  j  indexes the two 
types of capital39.       
 
      Our method for constructing a series on capital stock is one among several 
alternatives that have been used for constructing this variable.  However, while most 
studies employ the perpetual inventory method, theydo not differentiate between 
                                                
38  Rao (EPW, Jun 1994) provides data on book value of fixed assets by type, which 




39  Alternative approaches were also tried, such as a depreciation rate of 7.5 percent 
for PME, based on the idea that repair services in the developing economy may be 
cheaper, increasing the life of capital. Also, instead of deflating the split investment 
series, another option was to deflate the aggregate seri s by a Divisia deflator with 
flexible annual weights for PME and STR prices, andthen split the series into two 
kinds of capital, apply the PIM, and re-aggregate for the final stock series. These 
approaches yielded very comparable stocks, so they were not eventually used. Note 
that the implied depreciation rate for the stock as a whole is just over 10 percent, 






types of capital.  Differences in the assumed rate of depreciation, the initial level of 
stock, and the appropriate investment deflator can yield different estimates.  The 
typical assumption is a five percent depreciation rate, and a deflator which could be 
either the machinery and equipment price index, or the implicit price derived from 
current and constant price investment data for the aggregate economy (see for 
example Virmani 2004 or Goldar 2004).  Our improvement consists of making a 
basic distinction between plant, machinery and equipment (PME) stock, and 
structures (STR), both for the assumed rate of depreciation and the price of 
investment.  We are unable to use finer classificatons of capital, or rental rates to 
accurately measure prices, due to the lack of data.  Appendix Table A.5 shows the 
indices of real output and inputs obtained by these methods.  We can observe the 
relatively rapid accumulation of capital stocks in mid-to-late 1990s, and the 
subsequent easing in investment.  
 
     Several issues need to be highlighted in the measurement of labour input.  The first 
is how to measure labour input.  The definition of labour we use is referred to as `total 
persons engaged' in the ASI data, which apart from w rkers, managerial and other 
staff also includes unpaid members of the proprietor’s family who work in the 
factory.  Thus, we include all employees that are di ctly or indirectly connected with 
the production process.  We assume that the flow of labour services is proportional to 
the number of total persons engaged.  There are other approaches in the literature that 
attempt to adjust the labour input for enhancements in labour quality over time, say 




labour quality by taking the average years of education in each of the three main 
sectors (agriculture, industry and services), and assume a seven percent return to each 
year of schooling so that ,LeL as=∗  where a  is the assumed rate of return and s is 
the years of schooling.  They are able to do so since they use quinquennial survey 
data for the entire economy, which contains details about educational attainments of 
the labour force.  Lacking similar data on workforce characteristics within the ASI 
sector, as well as data on hours worked, we prefer to use the simpler formulation in 
which labour input is assumed to be proportional to the number of workers.  Also, 
since we analyze state level trends, labour quality changes might differ by state, and 
to accurately adjust for these differences one would require state-by-state 
characteristics of the ASI workforce, which we do not have.  Moreover, to the extent 
that improvements in labour quality are not paid-for, or occur on-the-job, they 
constitute enhancements in productivity and will be picked up by the productivity 
measure.  
 
     A second important issue with labour in growth accounting is its share in total 
output.  In our exercise, the contribution of labour to output is weighted by the share 
of payments to labour in total output.  Labour income is measured by `total 
emoluments’ that include wages and salaries, as well as the cash value of benefits.  
Under the competitive markets assumption, an input's share in total output measures 
its marginal product.  This has important implications for growth accounting since 
incorrectly weighting a particular input can distort the results on productivity growth.  




the share of labour in output becomes problematic since a large number of workers 
are self-employed, whose income reflects partly a payment to their own labour and 
partly to their ownership of capital.  Since the mixed-income sector in India is quite 
large (accounting for 45 percent of net domestic product (NDP) in 2002-03, and 79 
percent of the income of the unorganized sector (CSO 2005), see Bosworth et. al. 
(2007)), assigning a share in income to wages equal to that observed in the formal 
sector may be misleading.  In studies of the aggregate Indian economy, one expedient 
has been to simply assume a fixed income share for lab ur and capital, using 
observed shares in OECD countries, since these countries have relatively unchanged 
shares over time.  However given, the structural differences between OECD and 
emerging economies, it is not clear whether this is a good assumption to make.  
 
     In this study, we do not assume a fixed labour share in income.  This is for several 
reasons.  Firstly, this study deals only with the formal manufacturing sector, in which 
mixed income of the self-employed is not likely to be a big component, since the 
coverage of firms rules out very small firms in which mixed income is likely to have 
a significant share in output.  Secondly, due to repo ting requirements that ASI firms 
are subject to, the concern that the data are systematically incorrect are mitigated.  
What we observe in the data time is that the growth rate of labour has declined over 
time, as has its share in total output.  In Table 3 we see that the share of labour costs 
in total value of output has fallen from about 11 percent on average in the 1970s, to 
about 6 percent in the 1990s, and the average annual growth rate has fallen from more 




labour income is ASI value added was also documented by Goldar (2004), falling 
from 42 percent in 1981 to about 28 percent in 1997.  Goldar attributes the observed 
decline in the income share of labour to a labour saving bias in technological change, 
based on estimated elasticities from a translog production function.  However, if 
labour is a relatively cheap and plentiful resource, it is not clear why the bias of 
technological change should be labour saving.   
 
     There may be other factors at play that might lead to a falling share of labour in 
output.  For example, if Indian industry was over-manned prior to economic reforms, 
then with liberalization of the manufacturing sector, an adjustment towards a more 
appropriate factor mix may have taken place, to correct for that over-manning, which 
would appear as a fall in the growth rate of labour.  Moreover, with modernization of 
industry, diversification of the output mix, and improvement in quality of goods, the 
technology may call for greater capital intensity per se, compared to prior periods.   
 
     Finally, the impact of reforms on the manufacturing sector employment also 
appears to depend on industry and state-specific factors.  A recent study by Gupta, 
Hasan, and Kumar (2009) finds that labour intensive industries did not benefit much 
from reforms, and that states with relatively inflexible labour regulations have 









3.3.1.  All-India manufacturing  
 
     Figure 3 gives a snapshot of the growth rates of output and inputs.  Average real 
output growth increased from about 6.5 percent over1973-79 to 8.5 percent between 
1990-99, accompanied by an acceleration in capital accumulation from six percent to 
8-10 percent, over the same time frame.  On the othr hand, intermediate inputs 
growth declined from nine percent to 6.5-7 percent, while the growth rate of labour 
declined from almost five percent in the 1970s to between 0.5-1 percent in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
 
     Several factors acting in conjunction may explain the slow-down in labour growth.  
One possible cause may be a shift in the product mix, from labour-intensive to more 
capital intensive goods, which is supported by the observed increase in the rate of 
capital accumulation.  Another explanation may be that Indian industries were 
relatively over-manned in the pre-reform era, especially in public sector enterprises, 
whereas the greater play of market forces led to an adjustment towards a more 
efficient level of labour in existing industries.  A third hypothesis is that in the post-
liberalization phase, Indian industry adopted relatively labour-saving technologies 






     A number of works often report partial or single productivity measures, typically 
output per worker.  In Table 3, we find that output er worker growth increased from 
an average of 2.1 percent in the 1970s, to an average of seven percent over the 
following two decades, even as capital intensity (ratio of real capital stock to workers) 
and capital-output ratio increased.  We find that relative to the 1970s, capital intensity 
more than doubled in the 1980s, and was more than five times as high in the 1990s.  
The capital-output ratio almost doubled in the refom era.  These trends might reflect 
the greater ease with which capital could be imported with the gradual elimination of 
import restrictions in the first wave of reforms.  
 
     Turning to the sources of growth decomposition (Table 4), we clearly see that in 
the reform period, TP growth accelerated.  It was negative in the 1970s, and turned 
around quite sharply to a positive average growth ra e of 1.2 percent per year in the 
1980s, and an even higher 1.8 percent in the 1990s.  Column 4 and 5 compare the 
1970s and 1980s.  From these figures, it is easy to verify that capital accumulation 
contributed about 1.5 percentage points to output growth, which is not much higher 
than the contribution of TP growth.  Both capital accumulation and efficiency growth 
accounted for about 30 percent of output growth, while bulk of the rest was due to 
intermediate inputs growth40.  
                                                
40  The TPG numbers estimated here might look “small” when compared to the 
growth rate of output in manufacturing, and when seen against the growth rate of 
aggregate output in the economy as a whole. However it must be kept in mind that 
these are growth rates of the residual of manufacturing output growth over the entire 
base of inputs, not just the growth rate of value added over the share weighted growth 
rate of labour and capital. In fact, one can obtain he corresponding TFPG figures 





     The negative growth rate of TP in the 1970s resonates with the widely held 
impression that Indian development policies were misguided, by erecting barriers to 
trade, propping inefficient industries under state guidance, and stifling private 
economic activity with cumbersome rules and regulations that raised myriad 
bureaucratic hurdles to get anything done (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004).  The 
1970s also witnessed two major oil price shocks that may have contributed to the 
observed decline in TP growth.  Given restrictions  imports of technology and low 
levels of research and development domestically, firms may have found it difficult to 
substitute other inputs for more expensive energy, thereby sustaining negative 
productivity growth.  
 
     While the sharp turnaround in TP growth in the 1980s has been attributed to 
initiation of economic reforms41, the 1990s witnessed deeper liberalization and 
market-oriented economic policies, along with almost complete de-licensing of the 
                                                                                                                                 
of value added and intermediate inputs), as TFPG = TPG/(1-b), where b = share of 
intermediate inputs in gross output. Based on the data in Table 3, (1-b) = 0.2, 
implying TFPG as high as six percent in the 1980s and nine percent in the 1990s. 
 
41  Ahluwalia (1991) summarizes these changes as: "[T]he most important changes 
have related to reducing the domestic barriers to en ry and expansion to inject a 
measure of competition in domestic industry, simplifying the procedures, and 
providing easier access to better technology and intermediate material imports as well 
as more flexibility in the use of installed capacity with a view to enabling easier 






manufacturing sector.  In this period42, TP growth increased to 1.8 percent per year, 
while capital accumulation slowed down, its contribut on to average annual growth 
falling to roughly 1.25 percentage points.  Hence, efficiency gains offset the decline 
in input growth in the 1990s to hold output growth to the same level achieved in the 
1980s43.  The overall contribution of TP to output growth increased from about 14 
percent in the 1980s to 21 percent in the 1990s.  
 
     As an additional check on our results, slightly different end-points were used to 
calculating the decadal average growth rates of TP.  We find that the conclusion of 
accelerated TP growth in the 1980s and 1990s does not change (Table 5).  
 
                                                
42  The year 1991 was left out from the calculation of average annual trends for two 
reasons, Firstly, it is the year in which reforms were introduced, and secondly, that 
year India suffered a balance of payments crisis, and may bias our conclusions about 
trends for the decade as a whole. Note that the averages in Table 4 included 1991, to 
show that its exclusion does not change the qualitative conclusions regarding trends 
in TP growth. 
 
 
43  The results presented here are based on state-level manufacturing data, aggregated 
up from 1973 to 2003. These figures exclude the electricity, gas and water supply 
(EGW) sector, for which the ASI series were discontinued after 1997. We repeated 
this exercise using data including the EGW sector that allows us to cover a slightly 
different period from 1970-1997, based on published ASI data. In addition, data for 
the EGW sector were extrapolated forward to bring the coverage up to 2003. The 
results from this exercise are Table 4; qualitatively we find that TP growth 
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, and both capital ccumulation and intermediate 
inputs consumption slowed down in the 1990s. We also find that output growth 
including the EGW sector was somewhat lower in the 1990s than in the 1980s, and 
labour growth was slightly negative. However, since th  electricity sector in India has 
been in a process of major transformations since the late 1990s, the way these 
variables were measured before and after this process was initiated may not be strictly 
comparable. Hence, the results of this exercise may be seen as illustrative, and should 





     Our results suggest that economic reforms can le d to gains in resource efficiency, 
especially since the reforms were in large measure aim d at freeing up the 
manufacturing sector from the various burdens of the license-quota regime.  These 
results also mesh well with the evident rapid economic growth witnessed in the 
1990s, unlike findings in the literature of a slowdown in TFP growth during the 
reform periods, which were described previously.  The main difference in our 
approach is regarding the appropriate price deflator.  Our methodology does not 
suffer from the biases inherent in "single" and "double" deflation methods described 
earlier, and the weights for the various inputs and output that make up the 
manufacturing sector at the 2-digit level are derived extensive input-output 
information spanning both pre and post-reform years, that allows us to pick up any 
changes in the industrial structure that may escape attention in a fixed-weights 
deflation approach.  Figure A.1 in the Appendix (based on Table A.8) plots indices of 
TFP and TP derived under different assumptions and approaches to pricing 
intermediate inputs.  On the left panel, we plot TFP indices derived under single 
deflation, double deflation, and Divisia-type deflation respectively.  A feature of the 
price deflation method used for the TFP series is that they are based on fixed weights 
for the various commodities composing intermediate inputs (except in the case of 
single deflation where intermediate inputs are not separately deflated).  We see that 
single deflation produces a TFP series that shows a decline in the late 1970s and, then 
remains relatively flat in the 1980s.  On the other and, double deflation produces a 
series that shows a steep increase in manufacturing TFP in the 1970, and sharp 




produces a series showing sharp increases in the 1970s but steep declines in the 1980s 
and in the early 1990s.  On the right panel, where we plot indices of TP derived from 
Divisia type deflation using flexible weighting procedures.  In comparison to the TFP 
series, these series are relatively smoother, and the index derived in this study clearly 
shows a rising trend in the 1990s.  
 
3.3.2.  Regional results 
 
     Table 6 presents the sources of growth of real output per worker at the state level.  
To focus on convergence, the states are divided into three groups of roughly equal 
size, based on levels of output per worker in the base year (1970).  The period under 
review is divided into the 1970s, and 1980s, and 1990s and beyond.  In the first three 
columns of this table, we note that there is evidence i  support of convergence in the 
1980s, as output per worker grew faster in the middle and bottom group of states than 
in the top states.  This process appears to continue in the 1990s, albeit only for the 
bottom group, and at a lower growth differential compared to that observed in the 
1980s vis-a-vis the top group.  The growth rates of the respective inputs per worker 
suggest that in the 1980s, faster growth of capital er worker and of materials per 
worker (especially for the bottom group) drove the convergence in output per worker.  
In the 1990s, for the bottom group, capital per worker continued to grow faster than 
for the top group, and TP growth was somewhat higher in the 1990s relative to the 
top group as well.  TP growth appears to have played a smaller role in the observed 




bottom group relative to the top, in the 1990s.  
 
     Even though the contribution of TP growth to convergence in output per worker is 
marginal, the contribution manufacturing output growth has been quite significant.  In 
the 1980s, across the three groups, roughly 20 percent of the observed output growth 
could be attributed to TP growth, which increased in the 1990s to almost 25 percent.  
In contrast, the contribution to growth of capital per worker has stayed roughly 
constant at 13 percent of output growth for the twoop groups, and fallen from 20 
percent to 13 percent between 1980s and 1990s for the bottom group.  (The remainder 
of output per worker growth is accounted for growth in material inputs per worker).  
Thus, TP growth had a larger contribution to growth compared to capital intensity, 
which echoes the cross-country findings of Hulten and Isaksson (2007)44.  
 
     One can observe convergence across states in TP growth, which show that states 
that started off with lower initial levels of TP witnessed relatively faster TP growth 
rates in subsequent periods.  We estimated TP levels by extending the methodology 
used for the all-India sources of growth analysis to tate data45.  In Table 7 we see that 
firstly, TP levels increased in all states at the end of the 1990s compared to the 1970s, 
                                                
44  The Hulten-Isakkson study is based on TFP growth, using value added data, hence 
the contribution to growth can exceed 50 percent. Our growth accounting results are 









which mirrors the results found at the all-India level.  When we examine TP growth 
rates against initial levels of TP, we observe thatover 1970-2003, middle and bottom 
ranked states (ranked by level of TP in 1970) had higher TP growth rates than the top 
group (Table 8).  This catching up was most noticeable in the 1980s, whereas in the 
1990s, the growth rates are virtually identical.  A result to note is that the gap in 
levels between top and bottom, and top and middle stat s, fell from 13 percent to 
eight percent and from six percent to 5.3 percent rspectively.  Thus, although the gap 
in TP levels has narrowed across states, some gap appears to be persistent.  
 
     Given the relatively small share of manufacturing value added in state GDP 
(average of 11.6 percent46 in 2003-04), output per worker and relative TP leve s 
across states appear not to be strongly related to levels of state per-capita income 
across states.  We ranked states at two different poi s in our sample (1970 and 2003, 
in Table 9 and 10 respectively) according to levels of output per worker, TP, and per 
capita income, to see if there was a noticeable overlap between the various ranks.  For 
output per worker, we do not find this to be the case.  The correlation between output 
per worker and income per capita ranks was 0.3 in 1970, and negligible in 2003.  We 
do find a higher correlation for TP levels and income per capita, (between 0.65 and 
0.70 in 1970 and 2003 respectively).  However, this need not imply that higher levels 
of manufacturing TP cause higher per capita incomes, as they may be themselves be 
endogenous to per-capita income.  
                                                







     The results on regionalization of manufacturing sector growth can be summarized 
as follows.  Convergence in growth rates of output per worker is noticeable for states 
with lower initial levels of output per worker in manufacturing.  This was especially 
evident in the 1980s and to a lesser extent in the 1990s.  The main force behind 
convergence appears to have been faster growth in cap tal intensity and materials per 
worker, especially in the lowest ranked states (in terms of initial levels of output per 
worker).  TP growth appears not to have had a major role in the observed 
convergence in output per worker;  however, when TP growth rates are examined 
relative to TP levels in the base year, we find that st tes with lower initial levels of TP 
witnessed relatively faster TP growth in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, TP growth rates 
appear to be almost identical, and the gap in TP levels in the 1990s is narrower than 
that in the 1980s, and TP levels have increased in all states between 1970 and 2003.  
Finally, there does not appear to be a noticeable relationship between output per 
worker in manufacturing and state income per capita, on account of the relatively 
small share of manufacturing in state GDP.  One important implication of these 
results may be that the observed increase in income inequalities may not be driven by 
differences in manufacturing sector growth.  Given that levels of output per worker 
are have little correlation with income per capita, the convergence in growth rates of 
output per worker, and the relatively low share of manufacturing in state GDP, the 
sources of widening income inequalities would have to be from other sectors, namely 





Chapter 4: Infrastructure Spillovers  
 
4.1.  Description of variables 
 
     The task in this section of the dissertation is to explore the relationship between 
productivity in regional manufacturing (measured by TP) and the level of 
infrastructure.  In particular we are interested in spillover from infrastructure, and 
these spillovers may exert an effect beyond the geographical boundaries of a given 
state.  Our sample consists of 15 major states47, from 1970 to 2003.  
 
     Infrastructure is widely understood to be a major supply-side bottleneck in India, 
particularly for the manufacturing sector.  The Eleventh Plan (2006-7 to 2011-12) 
envisages infrastructure investment needs of more than US $500 billion (about 40 
percent of India’s current nominal GDP) across 10 infrastructure sectors, in order to 
meet GDP growth targets of 9-10 percent.  Almost 50 percent of the additional 
                                                
47  Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, 
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West 
Bengal are included in the sample. These 15 states comprise about 95 percent of the 
population the country. This set only excludes the small north-eastern states and 
Union Territories on account of incomplete data for b th ASI manufacturing and 
infrastructure variables. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh were bifurcated in 2000 to form 2 
new states, Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh. We continued to treat the two states as 
undivided, by aggregating the data from 2000 onwards for all the relevant variables. 
Although Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir are ncluded in our study of 
sources of growth in manufacturing, we exclude them fro  the econometric analysis 
as these states are mountainous, with limited additional road-building, and a large 
proportion of roads are built and maintained by the army and border security forces. 
Moreover, the data show downward jumps, in highway length, which could either be 






investment is to be directed towards electricity and roads, with electricity itself 
accounting for more than a third of the total planned investment in all 10 sectors48.  
Given the relative importance attached to roads and electricity we restrict our 
attention to these stocks.  Table 11 and Table 12.1 - 12.2 list the national and state-
wise stocks of national and state highways, and installed generation capacity in 
electric utilities.  
 
     Highways: The total road network of India is 3.34 million km, which is the second 
largest in the world, and at present carries 65 percent of freight and 85 percent of 
passenger traffic.  Roads are classified on the basis of administrative status and by 
function.  In this study we include National Highways (that are built and maintained 
by the central government), and State Highways (that are managed by states).  We 
consider these two types of roads, and exclude local r ads, since from an economic 
standpoint, highways are important, linking up national and state capitals, ports, rail-
heads, and link with roads outside the country.  Also, these roads are more likely to 
be associated with spillovers across state boundaries, than local roads.  
 
     However, despite their economic importance, natio l and state highways are a 
much smaller subset of total road length, comprising 65,569 km, and 130,000 km 
respectively49.  National highways thus comprise less than two percent of the total 
                                                
48  http://infrastructure.gov.in/pdf/IBEF.pdf 
 
 
49  Although the responsibility for maintaining national and state highways falls to 




network, but carry 40 percent of the total traffic.  Since roads are mostly provided in 
the public domain, the allocation of funds made avail ble for road building tends to 
favour the demands of the largest constituency.  Moreover, roads construction is the 
responsibility of state governments (except in the case of national highways).  Hence, 
local road projects such as rural roads and intra-district roads are likely to be 
preferred over other alternatives, such as multi-laning of state highways or pavement 
strengthening.  Raw data are supportive of this conjecture.  Between 1971 and 1991, 
one-half of the addition to the stock of surfaced roads (265,158 km out of 540,675 
km) was local roads.  In the second sub-period (1992-2003), total addition to the sum 
of National and State highways, and public works department (PWD) roads in 17 
major states was 249,254 km (not differentiating betwe n lane-km), of which 22,766 
km were National highways, 6,453 km were State highways, and the balance 232,287 
km were PWD local roads.  As pointed out above, most of the traffic moves on 
highways although bulk of the additional roads is not i  this category.  
 
     Since 2001, the National Highway Development Project (NHDP) was launched 
under the aegis of the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI), to undertake 
major upgrades and add to the National Highway network of the country.  In all, the 
programme has a total outlay of roughly US $40 billion.  The first pieces of this 
network were the Golden Quadrilateral and The East West-North South corridor, 
comprising long stretches linking major metropolitan cities and state capitals along 
                                                                                                                                 
respectively), there may be significant overlap between the two categories, as they 
constitute a continuous physical network. For this reason, we considered the 





the route.  We are unable to include the data from this project in our analysis as it 
falls outside our reference period.  
 
     Electricity: The supply of uninterrupted, high quality power is a prerequisite for 
industrialization.  However, India's electricity generation is frequently reported to fall 
short of demand.  For the year 2009-10, peak power deficit is expected to reach 12.6 
percent of demand, up from 11.9 percent the previous fiscal year50.  There has been 
significant growth in captive or own-account power g neration by firms over the 
years, which may be seen as a sign that utilities power is not sufficient for industrial 
users.  Estimates of captive power generation range between 14,000 and 20,000 MW, 
amounting to 20-25 percent of the installed capacity of utilities.  This is up from 
between 10-12 percent over 1972-92 (HBS 2006).  We do not include captive 
generation in our analysis, as we lack adequate data at the state level.  
 
     In the sample of 15 major states considered here, installed generation capacity in 
electric utilities alone has gone up from about 13,000 MW in 1970 to about 50,000 
MW in 1991, and to more than 75,000 MW in 2003.  Aggregate installed capacity 
was 104 GW in 2002, comparable to the generating capacity of UK and Germany, but 
in per capita terms, India's consumption (363 kWh per capita) is less than a thirtieth 
of that in the US, and about one-fifteenth of that in UK.  
 
                                                






     Bulk of the generating capacity in India (about 60 percent in 2002) falls under the 
management and ownership of State Electricity Boards (SEBs).  These SEBs suffer 
from routinely high losses, and face a number of prblems.  Firstly the average plant 
load factor (PLF) at which state-owned utilities run is only 65 percent, leading to high 
costs.  Secondly, states cross-subsidize agriculture at the expense of industrial power, 
and vested interests make it increasingly hard to levy user charges on this politically 
powerful segment.  
 
     For instance, in 2001-02, domestic and agricultural users consumed a total of 50 
percent of generated power.  Domestic users paid 195.6 paise51 per kWh, and 
agricultural users paid a subsidized rate of 41.6 paise per kWh.  In contrast, industrial 
consumers used 29 percent of generated power and paid almost twice the domestic 
rate (378.7 paise per kWh).  Industry thus subsidizes domestic and agricultural power 
consumption.  Thirdly, there are large transmission and distribution (T&D) losses52, 
which amounted to 28 percent of generated power in 2001-02.  In certain states, the 
losses are almost a half of generation, such as Haryan  (40 percent), Rajasthan (43 
percent), Andhra Pradesh (45 percent), and Orissa (51 percent).   
 
     A few caveats are in order for the electricity variable.  For our purposes, the ideal 
measure would be the actual amount of electricity transmitted to the manufacturing 
                                                
51  One paise = 100th of one Indian rupee. 40 Indian rupees are roughly equivalent to 
one US dollar. 
 
 
52  These losses are often on account of weak enforcement and outright theft of 




sector.  Installed capacity in utilities is only a proxy, as the amount of power actually 
generated and delivered can vary significantly from state to state and over time.  
Moreover, it excludes captive power generation.  Thus, this measure may be noisy, 
and not give us an accurate picture of the impact of electricity on regional 
manufacturing productivity and growth.  Secondly, the electricity sector has 
witnessed significant institutional changes since the enactment of the Electricity Act 
of 2003.  Among other things, an important aspect of the changes envisaged under 
this Act is the setting up of a mechanism to help deepen and develop the power-
sharing market, whereby electricity can be traded across regions in a quick and timely 
manner depending on varying demand and supply conditi s.  This may have a 
bearing on our results, since prior to this (including in our sample period), while 
power trading may have taken place across state boundaries, it may not have been 
rapidly responsive depending on demand and supply conditions.  Thus, spatial 
spillovers from electricity generation capacity may be harder to detect in the data 
from Indian states.   
 
4.2.  Descriptive statistics and preliminary exploration 
 
     Some of the problems in estimating infrastructure spillovers in our panel become 
evident from the descriptive statistics.  One issue i  the presence of a strong time 
trend in the productivity and infrastructure variables.  As shown in Table 12.1, within 
each state, correlation between the time trend and the highways variable ranges from 




trend ranges from 0.90 to unity (Table 12.2).  This points to potential problems in 
distinguishing the time trend from the infrastructure variables, notably electricity, in 
our estimates.  
 
     There is also a high degree of correlation among the infrastructure variables 
themselves, as shown in Table 13, which presents the average (across states) of cross-
correlations among the independent (infrastructure) variables.  We have defined two 
variants of the infrastructure variables;  "own" stocks refer to levels of road and 
electricity generation capacity within a given state's borders, whereas "contiguous" 
stocks are the (appropriately normalized and weightd) level of roads and electricity 
in states adjoining a given state53.  Both the own and contiguous levels of highways, 
and own and contiguous levels of electricity generation capacity are also highly 
correlated, apart from the high correlation of each of these with the time trend.  This 
suggests that multicollinearity might lead to estimation problems, if we use within-
state variation over time, to identify the relevant coefficients.  
 
     In the cross-sectional dimension, there appears to be some evidence that states 
with higher stocks of infrastructure also have higher levels of TP.  We present scatter 
plots of the state-wise time-average of TP levels stocks of highways and electricity 
generation capacity.  Looking at own stocks, Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that across 
states, on average, states with higher TP levels also had bigger stocks of highways 
                                                







and electricity.  When we consider combined own and contiguous stocks, the 
relationship with roads still appears to be positive (Figure 6), whereas the relationship 
with electricity looks relatively flatter (Figure 7).  
 
     Though the positive relationship suggested by these figures is not very strong, it 
may yet raise questions about the direction of causality, that higher productivity 
drives infrastructure levels, rather than vice-versa.  We note here that the provision of 
infrastructure is not based on the requirements of any one sector alone;  rather it 
serves a wider constituency including households, agriculture, and services, and 
hence is unlikely to be "caused" by purely changes in manufacturing sector 
productivity alone.  The registered manufacturing sector that we are considering is 
itself a subset of the industrial sector, which accounts for less than a fifth of GDP.  
There is also the policy thrust of balanced regional growth, which would tend to push 
infrastructure provision towards relatively under-dveloped states, than to states with 
a relatively well-established manufacturing sector.  
 
4.3.  Model specification 
 
     Recall that the Hicks-neutral shift parameter of the production function described 
in Section 3 was modeled as a function of infrastructure stock, and a time trend that 
captures the autonomous rate of technical change.  We now give this parameter a 









iti BeAtBA =   
 tiB .  is the stock of infrastructure in state i )...1( Ni =  at time t  )...1( Tt = , the initial 
level of productivity is given by the constant iA ,0 , λ  is the exogenous rate of 
technical change, and γ measures the infrastructure externality.  The total
productivity measure tiTP,  derived from the regional growth decomposition exercis  
is our measure ofA .  Substituting tiTP,  into (8) and take logs: 
 
 )9(    .lnlnln ,0, titi BtTPTP γλ ++=   
 
In this form, γ  measures the elasticity of TP with respect to infrastructure stock 
within a state, and this equation forms the key building block of our estimating 
equations.  In this form, the term γ  captures the "own" spillovers from infrastructure.  
 
     We employ the spatial econometric model developed by Kelejian and Prucha 
(1998, 1999), to expand the basic equation in order to take into account spatial 
spillovers from infrastructure.  The spatial framework is useful for modeling various 
types of spatial effects, including spatial correlations in the dependent variable 
(known as the spatial lag model), spatial spillovers from the independent variable(s), 
and spatially correlated errors (known as the spatial errors models).  A model may 
include any or all of these types of effects.  In our application, we incorporate spatial 
spillovers from the independent variable (infrastruc ure), given that physical 




resides in space.  The natural criterion for considering spatial spillovers in this context 
is adjacency, since states that share borders are most likely to experience spillovers 
from each other's infrastructure, than states not li ked, or those at one remove from 
the immediate vicinity.  
 
     Adjacency effects can be modeled by augmenting equation (9) in the following 
way.  Let W  be an N  x N  weighting matrix where the elements of row Ni ...1=  
assign weights to state i 's neighbours ,,, Njiij ∈≠  based on some notion of 
`distance'.  In this study, weights are assigned as 1, =jiw  if ji,  share a contiguous 








w  where jiw ,  is the weight assigned to state j  by the state in row i .  The 
value assigned to the diagonal is zero, that is, a state is not considered its own 
neighbour.  
 
     In our scheme, weights are assigned in a uniform way, depending on the number 
of neighbours that a state has.  However, the idealw ighting matrix for our purposes 
might take into account, for example, the density of traffic flow between two adjacent 
states to weight the neighbourhood stock of national a d state highways, rather than 
uniformly weighing the stock of all neighbours.  Similarly, we may prefer to weight 
the electricity stocks of adjacent states depending on actual power-trading data, or 
based on the sharing of transmission infrastructure.  Unfortunately, these alternatives 
are not available to us on account of lack of data.  Moreover, for our purposes, while 




are in a neighbourhood to each other, it will not overlook them altogether.  Hence as a 
first approximation of a weighting scheme for these types of variables, the uniform 
weighting may be adequate.  
 
     Let tB  denote an 1×N  vector of the stock of infrastructure in each state for a 
given year t .  We then define ][ tBW •  as an 1×N  vector containing weighted sums 
of neighbourhood infrastructure stock in year ,t  appropriately normalized54.  This 
natural log of this term, ]ln[ tBW •  is the additional term included in equation (9) that 
controls for adjacent levels of infrastructure.  The thi −  element of this vector is the 
log of the weighted sum of (normalized) infrastructure stocks in state si′  neighbours, 
for year t .  Let 1γ  denote the coefficient of within-state infrastructure stock )(ln tB  
and 2γ  the coefficient of the `neighbourhood stock' ]ln[ tBW • .  In addition to these 
regressors, we include a time trend variable τ  which captures exogenous technical 
change.  Thus our estimating equations becomes (includi g the constant term): 
 
34...1;]ln[ln][ln)9( 21 =+•++⊗+= tuBWBteeTP tttNNt γγλ   
 
     The error tu  is a combination of a spatially correlated component and an 
idiosyncratic component, to capture the possibility that spatially contiguous states 
                                                
54  In the case of national and state highways, we normalize by the area in square 







may experience spatially correlated shocks.  Let tu  and tε  be 1×N  vectors of error 
terms, and tu  is drawn from the following process: 
 
 ,][)11( ttt uWu ελ +•=   where ))(,0(..
2 NIdiit σε ∼    34,...,2,1=∈∀ τt .  
 
     One implication of this assumption is ,)var( 2, σε =ti  and 0)cov( ,, =tjti εε  , unless 
ji =  and .ts=  The scalar parameter λ is assumed to be time-invariant, and 
represents the spatial correlation across error terms.  This specification allows errors 
to be correlated within t across space, but uncorrelated over time.  This var ant is also 
known as the Spatial Errors Model, or SEM.  
 
   We can now stack the data by year.  Let ,)34,...,3,2,1( ′=T    TI  be an identity 
matrix, Te   )1,...,1,1( ′=  be a 1×T  unit vector, D  be an )1()1( −×− NN  matrix of 
dummy variables, and TPln  be the 1×NT  vector of productivity levels in each state 
and Bln  be the 1×NT  vector of infrastructure stock in each state.  This gives us: 
 
 ;])ln[(ln][ln)13( 21 uBWIBeTeeTP TNTN +•⊗++⊗+⊗= γγλ   
 
where ,][ ε+⊗= uWIu T  where u  and ε  are 1×NT  vectors.  I estimated this model 
using Jim LeSage's Spatial Econometrics Toolbox for Matlab, which is based on a 





4.4.  Regression results 
 
     The results of this exercise are presented in Table 14.  The baseline regression of 
TP on a constant and the time trend shows the time trend is positive and significant, 
and implies an autonomous rate of technical change of approximately one percent per 
year, that remains fairly stable in the various specifications.  HBS (2006) find lower 
estimates of 0.4 percent per year, but this may be attributed to our extension of the 
data to include several years after reforms in 1991, whereas HBS covers the period 
from 1974 to 1993.  
 
     The remaining columns consider the infrastructure variables.  In column 2 we 
introduce own stocks of national and state highways.  The coefficient is positive and 
significant, and although the size of this coefficient varies somewhat in the different 
specifications, it remains significant in all specifications in columns 1-9 where the 
variable appears.  The magnitudes of implied elasticities for own highways are small, 
ranging from 0.07 – 0.1 percent in the different equations.  Thus, a 10 percent 
increase in the "own" stocks of national and state highways would have a spillover 
impact of at most one percent increase in TP/output levels.  But it is worth keeping in 
mind that these are spillover effects, over and above the direct contribution of 
infrastructure to manufacturing output as an intermediate input. 
 
     In column 3 we consider only adjacent stocks of highways.  The estimated 




When both own and adjacent stocks of highways are int oduced into the equation 
(column 4), the adjacent stocks variable becomes negative (and significant), whereas 
the own stock variable becomes somewhat bigger than in column 2.  When all 
infrastructure variables are considered together (column 9), contiguous highways 
have a positive impact, but the coefficient is not significant.  
 
     Column 5 shows the effect of including only the own stocks of electricity 
generation capacity, along with the constant and time trend.  Again, we find a small 
positive and significant impact, which remains significant and almost of the same 
magnitude when adjacent electricity stocks are introduced in the equation (column 7).  
In contrast, adjacent stocks of electricity appear to have a negative and significant 
impact in all specifications, though the magnitude of the effect is quite small, 
implying a negative elasticity of TP to adjacent stocks of electricity of roughly 0.3 
percent, which is similar in magnitude to the positive elasticity of TP to own 
electricity stocks.  
 
     Finally, we introduce both highways and electricity variables together.  In column 
8 we consider own stocks of highways electricity.  Both variables have a positive and 
significant coefficient.  In the final column, we control for all four infrastructure 
variables.  Contiguous highways are not significantly correlated with TP, and own 
electricity, though positive, is no longer significant.  Own highways continue to be 
positive and significant and adjacent electricity is still negative and significant.  





     Given that our estimates of spillover effects from infrastructure may suffer from 
problems due to features of the data, the results given above need to be interpreted 
with caution.  Based on these results, there appears to be some evidence to suggest 
that own highway infrastructure may have positive spillover effects on TP, though as 
shown;  the effect size is quite small, ranging betwe n 0.07 – 0.1 percent.  At best, the 
results in column 9 of Table 14 would imply that ceeris paribus, if the stock of 
national and state highways within a state was doubled, the level of TP and 
manufacturing output would go up by around nine percent.  Similarly the impact of 
own electricity generation capacity on TP also appers to be positive, though it is 
even smaller in size (elasticity ranging from 0.2 to 0.4 percent), and the coefficient is 
not significant in the full model including all infrastructure variables.  
 
     In terms of adjacency effects, the coefficient o  adjacent highway stocks changed 
signs between specifications, making it difficult to interpret.  However, adjacent 
electricity stocks entered with a negative sign, the effect size implying a negative 
elasticity of around 0.3 percent.  As pointed out earli r, various studies and planning 
documents have pointed out the scarcity of electricity in India, and one would expect 
that additional electricity in the immediate neighbourhood would have a positive 
impact on TP and manufacturing output.  Thus, one would need to exercise even 
more caution in interpreting this particular finding.  It is possible that part of this 
negative impact reflects the sorting of high productivity firms to states that are 




electricity across state lines.  In fact, attempts to deepen and develop the market for 
power trading are relatively recent in India, marked with the passing of the Electricity 
Act in 200355 as highlighted earlier.  The lack of a well-developed market in power 
trading in prior periods may therefore explain in part our finding of a negative spatial 
spillover from electricity.  
 
     A related issue is that the amount and quality of electricity available to 
manufacturing industry across states may be insufficient to spur innovations, 
especially of the type that require uninterrupted an high quality power supply.  In 
other words, the first problem in India may be to achieve adequacy in electricity 
generation, given existing manufacturing technology.  The current level of electricity 
available to manufacturing may be below what is required even for running existing 
technology efficiently, and thus we do not observe positive spillovers that are spurred 
by relative abundance.  Finally, as mentioned earlir, generation capacity in utilities 
may not be a good proxy for the amount of electricity transmitted to the 
manufacturing sector.  Installed capacity must be used to supply agriculture, services, 
and households, apart from manufacturing industries.  Moreover, electricity 
transmission and distribution losses in India are quite high, as high as 50 percent in 
some states56.  The substantial growth of own-account power generation by firms may 
reflect this insufficiency.  Thus, our results should not be interpreted to imply that 
                                                
55  http://www.electricityindia.com/powertrading.html 
 
 





electricity has no spillover benefits;  rather the results may be pointing to a shortage 
relative to requirements, due to which the kind of spillovers we expect are not 
observed.  Last but not least, it is worth remembering the sheer size of Indian states, 
which might rule out large spillover effects per se.  
 
4.6.  Other specifications 
 
     This section contains results from other specificat ons that were also attempted, in 
addition to the spatial errors model that I chose to in erpret.  I considered a fixed 
effects estimator, and a "between" estimator, but the resulting coefficients either had 
implausible signs and magnitudes, or were not robust.  Table 15 presents the results 
from the fixed effects estimator.  Reading across the columns, the coefficient on own 
national and state highways stock is positive, but not significant in all specifications.  
On the other hand, the adjacent highways variable app rs to have a much larger 
magnitude than own highway stocks.  It seems counterintuitive that spatial spillovers 
from roads would exceed own spillovers, considering the fairly large size of Indian 
states.  Also, both electricity variables enter with a negative sign, and both are highly 
significant.  The magnitude of the coefficient on adjacent electricity appears to be too 
large to be plausible, as does the negative sign on own electricity stocks.  
 
     Results from the "between" estimator are in Table 16.  As can be seen, in this 
specification I did not find any evidence of spillover effects from infrastructure, 




considered a variant of the spatial errors model, which included a full set of state 
dummy variables (Table 17).  The inclusion of state dummy variables leads to the 
implausible result that own spillovers from highways are not significant in most 
specifications, whereas spatial spillovers from adjacent highways are positive, and 
significant.  Similar to the findings from the fixed effects model, both own and 
adjacent electricity variables enter with a negative sign, and while the own electricity 
variable is in general not significant, the adjacent electricity variable is highly 
significant, and has a large negative sign, implying very high negative spillovers from 





Chapter 5:  Summary and Conclusions 
 
     Industrial development is believed to hold the key to rapid and sustained economic 
growth in India.  While this was well-recognized by policy-makers at an early stage 
as reflected in various planning documents, the approach to the problem has changed 
considerably over time.  The issue of sustainable growth raises questions about what 
policies can help to achieve this objective. Concurrently, India is undergoing a 
transformation from a planned economy characterized by industrial regulation and 
licensing, administered prices, and restrictions on private activity to a more market-
driven economy more encouraging of entrepreneurship.   
 
     Focusing on the formal manufacturing sector, one f the main questions that we 
sought to answer is one that has triggered much debate, namely whether liberalization 
of the economy had a positive impact on productivity growth, and we found that the 
answer was affirmative.  This contributes to a long-running debate generated by the 
contentious finding of some research that liberalization led to a distinct deceleration 
in productivity growth, especially in the 1990s, which was the era of significant 
economic liberalization.  We highlighted the methodol gical problems that arose in 
the literature, mainly dealing with the appropriate deflator for manufacturing sector 
aggregates.  Correcting for these, we found that at the All-India level, manufacturing 
sector TP growth increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s, relative to the 
1970s.  This is in contrast to findings by Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan (1994) and 




1980s over the 1970s, and in contrast to Rodrik and Subramanian (2004), Goldar 
(2004), and Banga and Goldar (2007), who report negative TFP growth rates for 
economy and for the manufacturing sector in the 1990s.  Compared with these 
findings of slowing productivity growth, our results seem to be more plausible when 
seen against the observed high growth rates of the Indian economy the 1990s.  
 
     In the second part of this study we examined tr nds in output per worker and 
manufacturing sector TP growth at the state level.  We found evidence of 
convergence in output per worker growth, though the diff rence in growth rates was 
higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s, between the top group and bottom group of 
states, as ranked by initial levels of output per wo ker.  The data indicate that this 
convergence was driven mostly by capital intensity and only to a small extent by 
differences in TP growth. Examining trends in TP growth in greater detail, we found 
that TP growth had a bigger contribution to growth in output per worker than capital 
intensity, which accords with the recent findings of Hulten and Isaksson (2007), 
where they find that in a cross-country setting, TFP growth accounted for a major 
share of output growth in the aggregate economy.  In terms of TP levels, we find that 
all states have higher TP levels in 2003 than in 1970.  One interesting finding was 
that states with lower initial levels of TP had higher rates of TP growth, especially in 
the 1980s.  By the 1990s, however, TP growth rates ppear to be more or less equal 






     Several studies have documented the increasing disparity in income levels across 
states, and we use our evidence to explore the relationship between trends in state-
wise income per capita and manufacturing sector growth.  We related trends in state 
income per capita with output per worker and TP levels in manufacturing, and found 
that there was little evidence that states with higher levels of output per worker in 
manufacturing had higher levels of per capita income.  This is perhaps due to the 
relatively small share of manufacturing in state GDP.  Moreover, state-wise growth 
rates of output per worker in manufacturing appear to have converged in the 1990s.  
Read together with the evident lack of correlation between levels of output per 
worker and per capita income, and the low penetration of manufacturing in state 
GDP, it appears that the rising income inequalities across states are not driven by 
manufacturing sector trends, but may perhaps be on account of differences in other 
sectors.  
 
     Finally we addressed the issue of infrastructure and productivity growth.  In 
pursuit of balanced growth, and for sustained high growth rates particularly in the 
industrial sector, infrastructure development has been identified as a vital input.  
While physical infrastructure plays a key role in manufacturing as an intermediate 
input, we hypothesized that roads and electricity ma  also affect manufacturing 
productivity through network spillover effects on manufacturing output via their 






     Due to limitations in the data, it is hard to draw firm conclusions from the results 
of this exercise.  However, despite the lack of robustness in the results, and problems 
with the underlying data on account of collinearity among various explanatory 
variables, the evidence does seems to suggest the pres nce of small spillover effects 
from a state's own stock of roads, the elasticity of TP to own national and state 
highways (in length per square kilometer of state area) of around 0.07 – 0.1 percent.  
Own stocks of electricity generation capacity also appear to have a positive and 
significant impact on TP, though the effect is smaller than that estimated for 
highways.  The elasticity of TP to additional electrici y generation capacity (in kW 
per capita) was found to be around 0.02 – 0.04 percent.  
 
     Electricity generation capacity in neighbouring states appears to have a negative 
impact on state TP, i.e. spatial spillovers from electricity appear to be negative, 
contrary to our expectations.  On reflection, this may be driven a variety of factors.  It 
may reflect in part a dynamic sorting of high TP firms to areas with relatively 
abundant electricity, and may also reflect certain weaknesses in our measure of 
electricity.  The ideal measure in this context would be the amount of electricity 
transmitted to the manufacturing sector, given the prevalence of leakages in 
transmission and distribution, installed capacity may be less than ideal for our 
purposes.  Secondly, the market for sharing power across state boundaries is still 
evolving in India, thus one may observe the expected positive spatial spillovers as this 
market matures.  On a related note, the relatively small size of positive spillovers 




power generation is short of demand to such an extent that additional capacity does 
not attain a level necessary to spur technological improvements of the type that 








Appendix 1:  Text tables and figures 
 
Table 1. Share of manufacturing in state GDP, 20001
(In percent)
Gujarat 24.3 Andhra Pradesh 10.3
Haryana 18.7 Himachal Pradesh 9.6
Maharashtra 17.1 Assam 9.6
Tamil Nadu 15.5 Madhya Pradesh 9.5
Karnataka 14.5 Rajasthan 9.2
Punjab 12.9 West Bengal 8.5
Uttar Pradesh 11.1 Kerala 7.6
Bihar 10.9 Orissa 5.7
Mean 12.2
St. Dev. 4.8
1 Sample excludes Jammu and Kashmir on account of 














Author(s) Period Deflation Method
Ahluwalia 1965-85 1965-80 1980-85
1991 Single Deflation1 -0.3 3.4
Balakrishnan - Pushpangadan 1970-88 1970-79 1980-89 1970-8
1994 Single Deflation1 -0.71 1.47 0.38
Double Deflation2 3.5 0.19 1.84
Dholakia and Dholakia 1970-88 1970-79 1980-89 1970-89
1994 Single Deflation1 -1.69 1.89 -0.11
Double Deflation2 0.56 2.86 1.58
J M Rao 1970-92 1973-79 1980-92 1973-92
1996 Single Deflation1 0.33 1.51 1.14
Double Deflation2 6.6 0.02 2.09
Divisia deflator3 8.37 -1.78 1.43
Hulten and Srinivasan 1973-92 1973-82 1983-92 1973-92
1999 Divisia Deflation4 2.2 2.1 2.2
B. Unel 1979-97 1979-90 1991-97 1979-97
2003 Single Deflation1 1.8 2.5 1.8
B. Goldar 1979-00 1979-90 1991-97 1991-99
2004 Double Deflation2 2.14 1 1.57
Banga and Goldar 1980-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-99
2007 Double Deflation2 1.3 0.5 0.8
This study 1970-03 1973-80 1981-90 1992-03
2010 Divisia Deflation5 -1.2 1.2 1.8
5  Divisia deflation with flexible Input-Output matrix weights
4  Divisia-type deflation with flexible weight price indices
Table 2.  Summary of Results for Registered Manufacturing Productivity Growth
Productivity Trends
1  Based on manufacturing price index
2  Input deflator based on Input-Output 1973-74 weights for input commodities















1970-79 2.1 0.6 0.31
1980-89 7.1 1.4 0.44
1990-03 6.9 4.1 0.55














Gross Output 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.2 8.4 8.4
Materials 6.9 7.6 5.9 8.1 7.3 6.5
Labour 1.4 2.0 0.6 4.3 0.4 0.5
Capital 8.8 9.3 8.3 6.7 11.1 8.2
TP 0.8 0.2 1.5 -1.2 1.2 1.8
Share in Nominal Gross Output
Intermediates 78.2 77.6 78.9 76.5 78.5 78.9
Labour 8.0 9.4 5.9 10.6 8.5 5.8
Capital 13.9 12.9 15.2 12.9 13.0 15.3
Table 4.  Sources of Growth (1973-2003) - All India Aggregates1
(In percent)










1970-79 1973-79 1980-89 1990-97 1990-99 2000-03 1990-03
Series A1 -1.01 0.80 1.50 1.49 1.50
Series B2 0.03 1.17 1.70
Series C3 0.03 1.17 1.88 1.68 1.82
1 1973-2003, excluding electricity, gas, and water supply sectors.  
Table 5.  Averages of TP Growth Rates
2,3  Including electricity, gas, and water supply sectors. Data for this sector 
are from ASI published series in Series B (1970-1997), and imputed for years 




















1970-79 1980-89 1990-03 1970-79 1980-89 1990-03
Top group1 2.7 6.8 8.0 3.0 6.1 6.2
Middle group1 2.4 7.6 7.2 3.4 6.8 5.7
Bottom group1 2.2 8.6 8.5 2.6 9.6 7.1
1970-79 1980-89 1990-03 1970-79 1980-89 1990-03
Top group1 6.0 5.0 7.0 -0.3 1.4 1.9
Middle group1 1.9 5.4 6.8 -0.1 1.6 1.6
Bottom group1 4.5 9.0 6.1 0.8 1.5 2.1
Table 6. Sources of growth of output per worker in state level 
manufacturing
(Average annual growth rates)
1   Groupings are based on level of output per worker in 1970
Output per worker Capital per worker


















19702 20033 1970 2003
1 Andhra Pradesh 1.021 1.385 7 5 36
2 Assam 1.015 1.302 9 15 28
3 Bihar 1.011 1.367 10 7 35
4 Gujarat 1.089 1.376 2 6 26
5 Haryana 1.048 1.423 5 4 36
6 Himachal Pradesh 0.947 1.450 14 1 53
7 Jammu and Kashmir 0.859 1.345 16 10 56
8 Karnataka 0.985 1.249 11 16 27
9 Kerala 0.981 1.337 13 12 36
10 Madhya Pradesh 1.016 1.353 8 8 33
11 Maharashtra 1.141 1.440 1 3 26
12 Orissa 0.833 1.049 17 17 26
13 Punjab 1.052 1.442 4 2 37
14 Rajasthan 0.938 1.315 15 14 40
15 Tamil Nadu 1.040 1.338 6 11 29
16 Uttar Pradesh 0.982 1.328 12 13 35
17 West Bengal 1.052 1.353 3 9 29
2  Average over 1970-75
3  Average over 1998-03
TP level Rank
Table 7.  State-wise TP Levels and Ranks1 














(By tercile of TP level in 1970, in percent)
Tercile 1970-03 1970-90 1991-03 1970-80 1981-90 1992-03 1970 2003
Top 1.1 0.6 1.8 -0.3 1.4 2.2 1.1 1.4
Middle 1.3 0.9 1.9 -0.4 2.1 2.3 1.0 1.3
Bottom 1.4 1.1 1.8 -0.4 2.6 2.1 0.9 1.3
% Gap in TP level
Top - Bottom 13.0 7.9
Top -Middle 5.7 5.3
TP Levels2TP Growth Rates2
Table 8. State TP Growth Rates - Evidence of Convergence1
1 16 major states, excluding Jammu and Kashmir from original sample


























Maharashtra 1 1 2 2422
Punjab 2 4 1 2664
Haryana 3 5 3 2350
Bihar 4 10 16 911
Madhya Pradesh 5 8 11 1348
Middle
Gujarat 6 2 4 1931
Orissa 7 16 12 1309
Uttar Pradesh 8 12 14 1274
Tamil Nadu 9 6 9 1494
Rajasthan 10 15 15 1210
Karnataka 11 11 7 1510
Bottom
Assam 12 9 13 1277
West Bengal 13 3 5 1764
Andhra Pradesh 14 7 10 1372
Himachal Pradesh 15 14 6 1683
Kerala 16 13 8 1505
1 Based on 1970 levels
2 For 1980-81, Reserve Bank of India (in 1980-81 prices)



















Gujarat 1 6 6 22491
Himachal Pradesh 2 1 3 24830
Maharashtra 3 3 4 24767
Bihar 4 7 16 7735
Madhya Pradesh 5 8 13 12226
Middle
Uttar Pradesh 6 12 15 10324
Haryana 7 4 1 28071
Karnataka 8 15 9 18289
Rajasthan 9 13 11 15299
Orissa 10 16 14 11802
Assam 11 14 12 13734
Bottom
Punjab 12 2 2 26891
Tamil Nadu 13 10 7 20570
West Bengal 14 9 10 17915
Kerala 15 11 5 22786
Andhra Pradesh 16 5 8 19062
1 Based on 2003 levels
2 For 2003-04, Reserve Bank of India (in 2000-01 prices)
















































Table 11.  All-India Highway and Electricity 
Stock1
Correlation with time trend:









Kashmir Kerala Karnataka Maharashtra
Madhya 







1973 7771 3351 6293 9835 3457 3516 1202 2792 7973 17553 13310 3893 2839 10809 3597 10610 3773
1974 7812 3351 6293 9957 3752 3575 1205 2792 8054 17703 13310 3893 2839 10828 3610 10715 3776
1975 7812 3351 6294 10007 3772 3638 1232 2857 8058 17715 138553844 2869 10831 3610 10740 3778
1976 7812 3617 6302 10061 3779 3683 1238 2857 9522 17975 1393238 5 2877 9354 3610 10664 3824
1977 7812 3617 6307 10116 3779 3944 1238 2857 9583 20324 140743803 2877 9375 3610 10683 3824
1978 7815 3620 6309 10329 3788 3944 1302 2859 9620 21843 140743820 2877 9375 3663 10676 3874
1979 7815 3620 6309 10405 3791 4002 1302 2859 9770 21461 141343833 2877 9375 3678 10456 3874
1980 7815 3627 6309 10518 3791 4004 1281 2865 9770 21786 141684465 2877 9375 3679 10440 4618
1981 7815 3727 6309 10579 3791 3837 1281 2892 9781 21894 141794465 2877 9786 3681 10441 4752
1982 7815 3727 6309 10579 3791 3840 1281 2918 9781 22072 143194465 2877 9786 3681 10430 4777
1983 9422 4002 6309 10626 3791 3912 1281 2918 9880 22026 143824458 2877 9786 3681 10433 4777
1984 9422 4029 6309 10706 3791 3916 1281 2883 9880 21999 14411458 2877 9978 3697 10435 4777
1985 10898 4090 6310 10808 3792 4128 1336 2860 9880 22007 14393 4470 2877 9978 3719 10434 5085
1986 10976 4100 6310 10863 3792 4128 1336 2841 9880 22197 14393 4552 2940 9978 3747 10508 5085
1987 10976 4114 6310 10954 3792 4128 1336 2841 9880 22479 14509 4552 2940 9981 3764 10503 5085
1988 11018 4122 6310 10954 3792 4241 1336 2861 13167 33503 14589 4552 2927 9981 3768 10737 5085
1989 11238 4122 6310 16996 3792 4454 1336 2865 13223 32913 14650 4552 3146 10075 3768 12178 5085
1990 11238 4122 6310 18002 3792 4392 1336 2865 13228 33215 14686 4552 3146 10075 3779 12483 5085
1991 11238 4122 6310 20620 3792 4392 1336 2865 13279 33543 14693 4552 3146 10087 3917 12524 5106
1992 11238 4122 6310 20962 3792 4402 1336 2865 13285 34249 14711 4552 3146 9982 3922 12536 5106
1993 11333 4149 6310 21061 3792 4385 1336 3059 13285 34249 14731 5633 3154 9997 3931 12531 5039
1994 11726 4149 6310 21181 3792 4390 1336 3059 13392 34900 14731 5640 3154 11566 3931 12510 5039
1995 11726 4149 6310 21227 3792 4399 1336 3059 13392 34900 14736 5640 3154 12656 3935 12510 5039
1996 11726 4149 6310 21289 3792 4404 1336 3372 13392 35207 14765 5985 3154 12852 3936 12509 5039
1997 11755 4149 6310 21333 3792 4415 1336 4780 13392 35317 14765 6209 3364 12893 3936 12530 5133
1998 11813 4257 6739 21798 4074 4536 1336 4780 13403 35480 15169 6280 3364 13148 4493 12704 5124
1999 12403 4547 7271 22037 4497 4755 1426 4779 13255 36849 16783 6565 3494 14128 7897 13751 5314
2000 12265 4601 7731 21620 3822 4870 1426 5343 13223 36838 17136 6913 3494 13279 7897 14169 5186
2001 12063 4731 9107 21590 3822 4870 1511 5368 13399 36838 18400 7351 3719 13195 7926 16874 5186
2002 12239 4731 9107 21624 3822 4870 1511 5289 13399 37031 18400 7351 3719 13113 10936 16225 5484
Correlation with time trend:
0.94 0.94 0.58 0.91 0.47 0.96 0.88 0.75 0.91 0.95 0.80 0.92 0.90 0.76 0.64 0.83 0.87
Min 0.47
Max 0.96
(Sum of national and state highways; in 











Kashmir Kerala Karnataka Maharashtra
Madhya 







1973 670 197 604 954 504 51 82 625 967 1882 777 684 771 583 1654 1558 1333
1974 890 197 604 1173 557 53 94 625 967 2070 776 803 886 581 1654 1841 1279
1975 990 167 604 1361 617 52 102 755 1056 2480 895 863 999 581 1764 2087 1399
1976 1200 160 712 1595 617 53 101 1013 1056 2600 895 923 976 581 1764 2499 1385
1977 1520 162 890 1711 742 113 136 1012 1145 2822 1135 923 1246 684 1824 2868 1389
1978 1620 162 891 2216 978 113 171 1012 1145 3322 1318 923 1541 820 2119 3076 1511
1979 1930 162 890 2212 1081 114 206 1012 1335 3552 1528 923 1536820 2329 3340 1611
1980 2240 228 941 2197 1141 129 206 1012 1470 3992 1630 923 1536810 2329 3612 1726
1981 2240 333 940 2407 1141 127 206 1012 1740 4322 1631 1032 1586 810 2539 3751 1726
1982 2678 334 1051 2576 1213 128 206 1012 1875 4862 1841 1442 1704 1023 2539 3752 1996
1983 2830 349 1160 2786 1266 128 206 1012 2010 5572 2471 1134 1828 1167 2509 3916 2124
1984 3156 432 1374 3106 1311 134 205 1012 2220 5995 2681 1134 2315 1180 2509 4148 2394
1985 3366 432 1595 3316 1429 134 205 1309 2530 6884 2944 1235 2449 1230 2529 4355 2694
1986 3595 507 1595 3526 1553 135 207 1476 2530 7011 2997 1235 2459 1233 2795 4566 2619
1987 3614 507 1549 3863 1569 154 210 1477 2530 7272 3042 1394 2660 1212 3300 4887 2619
1988 3614 537 1549 3973 1787 274 235 1477 2530 7482 3087 1394 3048 1467 3642 5417 2619
1989 4064 537 1549 4220 1795 274 284 1477 2645 8208 3088 1574 3049 1722 3875 5527 2619
1990 4130 537 1549 4395 1780 272 262 1477 2970 8705 3298 1612 3049 1722 4089 5527 3071
1991 4224 537 1544 4737 1780 272 262 1477 2986 9207 3383 1612 3289 1732 4311 5179 3135
1992 4226 537 1548 4891 1780 272 262 1477 3052 9129 3533 1742 3499 1733 4315 5075 3315
1993 4727 577 1550 4938 1780 272 337 1484 3167 9339 3783 1742 3509 1943 4317 5575 3525
1994 5209 597 1765 4939 1780 274 362 1492 3377 9987 3864 1952 3509 1949 4737 6075 3550
1995 5210 597 1768 5329 1780 289 366 1492 3379 10000 3864 1692 3509 1985 5067 6069 3575
1996 5709 597 1983 5457 1780 300 366 1566 3385 10000 3873 1693 3509 1985 5723 6059 3595
1997 6208 617 1988 6520 1780 299 374 1771 3450 10500 3878 1693 3719 1985 5763 6169 3866
1998 6214 622 1988 6973 1780 299 374 1816 3973 11600 4094 1698 3929 2235 5988 6085 4131
1999 6255 622 1988 7223 1780 300 409 2118 4368 12400 4353 1993 3929 2487 6052 6053 4373
2000 6756 622 2108 7223 1990 326 417 2218 4465 12900 4373 2298 4529 2489 3521 6567 4783
2001 7238 622 2228 7352 1990 412 496 2239 4987 13200 4408 2298 4529 2999 3802 6600 4784
2002 7616 622 2228 7323 1990 612 496 2239 5197 13200 4500 2304 4533 3077 7146 6600 4784
Correlation with time trend:





















Own highways 0.79 0.83 1
Contiguous highways 0.87 0.93 0.82 1
Own electricity 0.72 0.90 0.72 0.79 1
Contiguous electricity 0.77 0.95 0.75 0.82 0.93 1
















Dependent variable: TP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Trend 0.0118 0.0104 0.0114 0.0103 0.0103 0.0128 0.0114 0.01 0.0115
(16.33)*** (15.96)*** (15.93)*** (16.11)*** (13.13)*** ( 15.61)*** (13.55)*** (14.70)*** (15.61)***
0.0862 0.1129 0.0753 0.0908
(9.36)*** (9.11)*** (7.33)*** (7.68)***
0.0234 -0.0249 0.0119
(3.78)*** (-3.17)*** 1.35
Own Electricity 0.0436 0.0416 0.0177 0.0048
(6.12)*** (6.05)*** (2.33)*** 0.63
Contiguous Electricity -0.0298 -0.0284 -0.0449
(-6.45)*** (-6.40)*** (-8.80)***
Constant 0.9228 1.203 0.9916 1.2166 1.3832 0.6147 1.0686 1.354 0.8377
(63.79)*** (36.95)*** (42.93)*** (37.44)*** (18.06)*** ( 12.15)*** (11.94)*** (18.62)*** (8.60)***
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Number of states 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Lambda 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.42 0.50
t-stat (lambda) (8.60)*** (8.58)*** (8.64)*** (8.65)*** (9.43)*** (9.22) *** (9.75)*** (8.71)*** (9.73)***
R-squared 0.6484 0.70 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.75
Own National + State Highways
Contiguous National + State 
Highways
 t statistics in parantheses; *** indicates significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent level.
error structure: u = lambda*Wu + e, W = weights matrix









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Trend 0.011 0.01 0.009 0.016 0.02 0.02 0.015 0.018
(25.38)*** (14.83)*** (14.22)*** (27.96)*** (28.22)*** ( 28.33)*** (23.81)*** (20.45)***
0.038 0.012 0.047 0.031
(1.74)* (0.54) (2.30)** (1.57)
0.146 0.14 0.135
(4.01)*** (3.64)*** (4.02)***
Own Electricity -0.117 -0.044 -0.119 -0.051
(7.86)*** (2.77)*** (8.01)*** (3.27)***
Contiguous Electricity -0.221 -0.191 -0.188
(12.00)*** (9.03)*** (9.03)***
Constant 1.042 1.366 1.386 -0.316 -1.391 -1.549 -0.549 0.451
(14.58)*** (12.22)*** (11.75)*** (2.01)** (7.22)*** (4.4 3)*** (4.43)*** (4.43)***
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Number of states 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Own National + State Highways
Contiguous National + State 
Highways
t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent level.











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.106 0.15 0.092 0.131
(2.38)** (2.47)** (1.7) (2.02)*
0.023 -0.039 -0.02
(0.73) -1.06 -0.46
Own Electricity 0.052 0.06 0.019 0.026
(1.54) (1.72)* (0.51) (0.72)
Contiguous Electricity -0.013 -0.025 -0.033
(-0.46) (-0.92) -1.13
Constant 1.445 1.189 1.471 1.641 0.997 1.478 1.588 1.403
(10.68)*** (13.33)*** (10.75)*** (4.89)*** (3.60)*** (3. 88)*** (5.04)*** (3.50)***
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Number of states 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
R-squared 0.3 0.04 0.36 0.15 0.02 0.21 0.32 0.46
Own National + State Highways
Contiguous National + State Highways
t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent level.











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Trend 0.0123 0.0106 0.0113 0.012 0.0162 0.0169 0.0125 0.0161
(16.95)*** (13.14)*** (12.21)*** (12.21)*** (17.62)*** ( 15.92)*** (16.76)*** (13.94)***
-0.035 -0.0256 -0.0255 -0.0017
(-2.18)** (-1.53) (-1.44) (-0.10)
0.0799 0.0624 0.0762
(2.44)** (1.79)* (2.27)**
Own Electricity -0.0078 -0.0179 -0.0102 -0.0233
(-0.58) (-1.45) (-0.74) (-1.86)*
Contiguous Electricity -0.1272 -0.1323 -0.132
(-5.96)*** (-6.15)*** (-6.11)***
Constant 0.9318 1.3041 1.1725 0.9501 -0.3503 -0.5846 0.8558 -0.3771
(19.71)*** (11.47)*** (8.23)*** (7.03)*** (-1.51) (-2.05)** (5.93)*** (-1.25)
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Number of states 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Lambda 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.62
t-stat (lambda) (24.71)*** (24.17)*** (24.10)*** (19.05)*** (18.70)*** ( 18.90)*** (18.03)*** (17.41)***
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.92
all regression include state dummy variables for N-1 states
Own National + State Highways
Contiguous National + State Highways
 t statistics in parantheses; *** indicates significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent level.
error structure: u = lambda*Wu + e, W = weights matrix











1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Figure 1. Gini coefficient of income inequality across states over time1
(Based on per-capita gross state domestic product)
Source: Planning Commission, Eleventh Plan document, Chapter 7
1 Solid markers indicate gap years.




























































































































1  Manufacturing WPI based on official data from Central Statistical Organization (CSO) official series
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Average (ln)  own national and state highways per square km (1970-03)












































Average (ln) own electricity generation capacity per capita (1970-03)












































Average (ln) own + contiguous national and state highways per square km 
(1970-03)















































Average (ln) own + contiguous electricity generation capacity per capita (1970-
03)



























Appendix 2:  ASI data definitions, construction of price and quantity indices 
 
     1.  Data Definitions: Following are the terms and definitions employed by ASI in 
measuring state-level industrial aggregates.  Note that all definitions are taken from ASI 
1973-74 -- 2003-04 (Vol. II) published by the EPW Research Foundation.  For all 
variables below, data for the year 1972-73 was not available, and was approximated by 
linear interpolation.  
 
     Total Persons Engaged: was used as the measure of labour input.  ASI defines Total 
Persons Engaged as all persons engaged by the factory whether for wages or not, in work 
connected directly or indirectly with the manufacturing process and include all 
administrative, technical, clerical staff as also labour engaged in production of capital 
assets for factory's own use.  This is inclusive of persons holding supervisory or 
managerial positions or engaged in administrative office, store keeping section and 
welfare section, sales department as also those engag d in the purchase of raw materials 
etc. , and production of fixed assets for the factory and watch and ward staff.  It also 
includes all working proprietors and their family me bers who are actively engaged in 
the work of the factory even without any pay and the unpaid members of the co-operative 
societies who worked in or for the factory in any direct and productive capacity.  (Note 
that in summary reports published prior to 1979-80 total persons engaged was termed as 
employees.  Lacking data on Total Persons Engaged before 1980, employee data was 





     Total Emoluments: measures payment to labour input.  Emoluments include wages 
and salaries, and imputed value of benefits including those paid in kind.  
 
     Total Inputs: is the current cost of fuels, electricity, materials, and services (such as 
freight and transport charges, communication costs, and insurance and banking costs) 
consumed in production.  
 
     Capital Stock: series was built using the perpetual inventory method as in most 
studies.  For this, ASI gross investment data at current prices was employed.  For years 
prior to 1979, the gross investment series was not available, and was estimated using ASI 
depreciation and net fixed capital stock data57.  
 
     Gross Value of Output: is the measure of output employed for estimating Total 
Productivity.  This is the ex-factory value of ASI "product", which includes all goods 
except intermediates produced in the year, whether sold or not, and inclusive of fixed 
capital produced by the factory for its own use.  
 
     2.  Electricity, Gas and Water Supply Sector: In order to exploit the entire available 
time series up to 2003 for all other sectors, aggreates for this sector were imputed from 
1997 onwards, based on historical growth rates.  The imputed aggregates were applied to 
both the All-India series, and the state-year serie.  Average growth from 1990-97 was 
chosen for extrapolation.  It is arguable that a more recent average, such as 1993-97 
                                                





might have been appropriate, but the growth rate of employment, coming off a trough in 
the preceding five years, would likely over-estimate labour.  The other growth rates from 
1990-97 and 1993-97 appear comparable.  Also, barring depreciation rates, the 1973-97 
averages and 1990-97 averages seem comparable too.  Sec ndly, the average share of the 
aggregates of this sector in each state's aggregates w s estimated using state-industry data 
(available from 1979-1997), and the imputed values (additions to 1997 stocks) were split 
up between states based on this share.  Imputed addition to capital stock was assigned 
according to EGW's average share in state net capital stock at book value.  
 
     3.  Methodology for construction price deflators 
 
     The approach to constructing price deflators in th s study is to derive a set of weights 
for the aggregate output and aggregate intermediate input series respectively.  These 
weights are then used to combine wholesale price indices corresponding to the ASI 
industries at the 2-digit level that were aggregated in this study to for state level (and all-
India) aggregate series.  
 
     Table A.1 lists the 25 ASI 2-digit industry groups that are included in our measure of 
aggregate gross output, the weight of the industry group in the output price index, as well 
as the name of the wholesale price index that most cl ely maps into the given industry 
group's output.  Similarly, Table A.2 lists 21 ASI 2-digit industry groups that are included 
in our measure of aggregate intermediate inputs, the weights of each industry group in the 




industry.  The weights in both tables refer to years fo  which I was able to obtain I-O 
information for the aggregate Indian economy.  The commodity-flow matrix (or 
absorption) matrix in the I-O tables details the deliveries of commodities to industries for 
intermediate consumption, as well as the deliveries of commodities to final demand in the 
aggregate economy.  There are 6 categories of final demand: (i) Private Final 
Consumption Expenditure (ii) Government Final Consumption Expenditure (iii) Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (iv) Change in Stocks (v) Exports and (vi) Imports.  Strictly 
speaking, the commodity/industry table is not symmetric, in the sense that by -- products 
of given industry are treated as the principle output of the industry that produces this 
particular as the main product.  Hence, row (commodity) totals are not equal to column 
(industry output) totals.  This is not a problem for out price indices, as we are eventually 
interested in what prices industries receive for their output, whether it be their principle 
product or a by-product.  
 
     An additional note on the I-O tables is that while for 1973-74 we only had a 60-sector 
classification, this expanded to 115 sectors in subsequent rounds.  Not wanting to lose the 
earliest I-O information, I aggregated all the other y ars also up to the 60-sector 
aggregate, using the official aggregation provided in I-O tables.  Also, although I have 
tried to create a price index that refers to only those industries covered in the ASI frame 
at the 2-digit level, the I-O information itself is based on economy-wide flows, not 
limited to the registered manufacturing sector.  In other words, the weights derived from 
I-O information are also based on informal sector manufacturing.  It is quite possible that 




from that of the formal sector, hence the weights are proxies at best.  However, this 
concern is mitigated when one recalls that the formal sector accounts for bulk of the 
flows of intermediate consumption and gross output in the manufacturing sector as a 
whole (refer footnote 8 in text).  
 
     Deriving weights for output prices: 
 
     For each I-O year, I isolated the deliveries to final demand of the 25 ASI industries 
(commodities) covered in our sample.  However, since commodity flows to intermediate 
and final demand also include imported commodities, hese have to be netted out from 
the flows in order to price only domestic production.  Using the import flow matrix 
(available in I-O tables from 1989-90 onwards, but not for previous rounds), it is possible 
to distinguish flows of imports to intermediate consumption and to final consumption 
(PFCE, GFCE, and GFCF) respectively58.  
 
     Having isolated deliveries to final demand in this way, we then weight each industry 
according to its share in deliveries to final demand, by all 25 ASI industries.  Hence, if  
,Fiiiiii MXIGFCEPFCEY −+++=  where 
F
iM  is imports for final demand of 
                                                
58  The import flow tables show no deliveries of imports to Change in Stock; all imports 
are exhausted between intermediate use and the three cat gories of final demand above. 
For years prior to 1989-90, a simple expedient is to calculate the fraction of imports-to-
intermediate use over total imports from the closest I-O round for which data are 
available, and impose that fraction on total imports as given in the absorption matrix of 












Σ=   Thus we 
obtain five sets of weights for industry output, one for each available I-O year.  Table A. 
1 shows how that the weights for output tend to be relatively stable over time.  However, 
the weights for iron and steel, petroleum products, and miscellaneous manufacturing have 
gone up in a noticeable way.  
 
     Deriving weights for input prices: 
 
     For each I-O year, I isolated flows of the 21 input goods listed in Table A.2 to the 25 
ASI industries in our sample.  I excluded flows of these input commodities to all 
industries not covered in the ASI frame, so that the resulting input price deflator is as 
specific to ASI as possible.  I did not in this case net out flows of imports to intermediate 
demand, as we are interested in prices paid by ASI industries for the consumption of 
intermediate goods irrespective of the source of origin.  
 















Σ=  and jim  is the consumption of intermediate input j  by industry 
.i  This exercise shows that intermediate input structure has changed substantially over 
time.  Table A.3 showed that the share of services inputs has increased quite substantially 
in the 30 year time frame.  In addition we can see from Table A.2 that the share of 




electricity has increased.  This shows that there could be potentially severe pitfalls from 
using fixed weights for the input price index, if the growth rates of these commodities 
differ from each other.  
 
     Using the weights derived in the above manners, aggregate output and input price 
indices could then be constructed by combining the change in individual industry price 











−Σ=∆  where QtP  is the aggregate output index and 
Q
tiP,  is 











−Σ=∆ µ  We set the value of each price index = ln(100) in 
the year 1993-94.  We can then increment (decrement) this base value by the estimated 
change in log-levels as shown above.  The exponent of this incremented (decremented) 
value yields the requisite price index.  The index levels are given in Table A.6, along 
with the official manufacturing WPI series as published by the CSO.  Note that for the 
purpose of estimating TPG and TP levels, we only need to know the growth rates of the 






























































































































Divisia deflation (Rao) 2/
Divisia deflation (Hulten et. al.) 3/
Divisia deflation (current)
Figure A.1 TFP and TP Indices Under Different Deflation Methods
(1973=100)
1 Data from Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan (1994)
2   Data from Rao (1996)
3 Data from Hulten, Bennathan and Srinivasan (2006)







































99 Wholesale price index series
1 20 Wood and wood products except furniture 0.003  0.004 0.001  0.004 0.004 Wood products
2 21 Furniture and fixtures 0.013  0.007 0.004  0.010 0.020 Wood products
3 22 Paper and paper products 0.003  0.004 0.003  0.009 0.009 Paper products
4 23 Printing, publishing, and allied activities 0.041  0.040 0.029  0.026 0.021 Paper products
5 25 Plastic and rubber products 0.041  0.048 0.043  0.052 0.046 Plastic and rubber products
6 26 Petroleum products 0.032  0.089 0.047  0.045 0.052 Mineral oils
7 28 Inorganic heavy chemicals 0.007  0.006 0.005  0.003 0.004 Chemicals and chemical products
8 29 Organic heavy chemicals 0.002  0.008 0.010  0.008 0.011 Chemicals and chemical products
9 30 Fertilizers 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 Fertilizers
10 31 Paints, varnishes and lacquers 0.004  0.005 0.004  0.005 0.006 Paints, varnishes, and lacquers
11 32 Other chemicals and chemical products 0.086  0.088 0.074  0.081 0.076 Chemicals and chemical products
12 33 Cement 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 Cement, lime, and plaster
13 34 Non metallic mineral products except cement 0.084  0.071 0.055  0.042 0.045 Non-metallic mineral products
14 35 Iron and steel industries and foundries 0.014  0.002 0.016  0.037 0.033 Iron and steel
15 36 Other basic metal industries 0.001  0.001 0.002  0.003 0.003 Basic metals and alloys
16 37
Metal products except machinery and transport 
equpiment
0.068  0.053 0.070  0.064 0.065 Metal products
17 38 Agricultural machinery 0.020  0.017 0.021  0.019 0.019 Non-electrical machinery and parts
18 39 Industrial machinery for food and textiles 0.024  0.020 0.015  0.010 0.010 Food and textile machinery
19 40 Other machinery 0.129  0.123 0.135  0.115 0.108 Electrical machinery
20 41 Electrical machinery, apparatus, and appliances0.149  0.137 0.160  0.164 0.159 Electrical industrial machinery 
21 42 Railway transport equipment 0.007  0.026 0.018  0.020 0.014 Transport equipment and parts
22 43 Other transport equipment 0.118  0.124 0.164  0.123 0.094 Transport equipment and parts
23 44 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 0.129  0.104 0.081  0.110 0.145 Manufacturing wholesale price index
24 46 Electricity 0.014  0.003 0.023  0.032 0.036 Electricity 
25 47 Gas and water supply 0.009  0.021 0.022  0.015 0.021 Electricity, gas and water GDP deflator1
Total 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Input-Output table


















99 Wholesale price index series
1 Food (Primary Articles) 0.299 0.168 0.119 0.108 0.128 Food - Primary Articles
2 Eggs, Fish, Meat/Milk 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.024 0.026 Eggs, Fish, Meat
3 Logs and Timber 0.013 0.022 0.037 0.012 0.011 Forestry-GDP Deflator1
4 Coal 0.014 0.035 0.002 0.043 0.038 Mining - GDP Deflator1
5 Mineral Oils 0.067 0.138 0.104 0.104 0.091 Mineral Oils
6 Sugar/Edible Oil 0.037 0.035 0.011 0.012 0.025 Sugar
7 Beverages and Tobacco 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 Beverag s and Tobacco
8 Cotton Textiles 0.069 0.085 0.065 0.052 0.039 Cotton Textiles
9 Wood and Wood products 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.010 Wood and Wood products
10 Paper and Paper products 0.023 0.024 0.029 0.023 0.022Paper and Paper products
11 Leather and Leather products 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 Leather and leather products
12 Rubber and Plastic 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.018 0.015 Rubber and Plastic products
13 Chemicals and Chemical products 0.084 0.081 0.126 0.135 0.125 Chemicals and chemical product
14 Non-metallic mineral products 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.005.005 Non-metallic mineral products
15 Electricity 0.042 0.079 0.092 0.094 0.106 Electricity
16 Gas and Water Supply 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 Gas/Water Supply GDP Deflator1
17 Railway Transportation 0.022 0.024 0.029 0.026 0.023 Rail Transport GDP Deflator1
18 Other Transportation 0.030 0.028 0.042 0.088 0.059 Other Transport GDP Deflator1
19 Communication 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.009 0.008 Communication GDP Deflator1
20 Banking 0.025 0.024 0.038 0.035 0.062 Banking  GDP Deflator1
21 Insurance 0.003 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.007 Insurance  GDP Deflator1
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Input-Output table







1973-1974 1983-1984 1989-1990 1993-1994 1998-1999
8.60% 9.80% 14.70% 17.50% 17%
Table A.3.  Weight of Services in Intermediate Inputs1
1Services include construction, transportation, communication, banking, 

































Table A.4.  Type of Investment by 
ASI Industries1,2
1  Estimates based on National 
Accounts Statistics (NAS) data on 
All-India investment by public, 
private corporate, and household 
sector in these 2 categories, applied 
2  Figures from 1970-1973, and 







Output Intermediate Labour Capital
1973 26.7 27.0 66.9 16.8
1974 26.6 28.3 70.2 16.1
1975 28.4 32.2 74.0 17.8
1976 32.5 36.0 76.9 17.6
1977 35.5 39.3 81.5 18.3
1978 39.1 42.6 83.2 20.1
1979 39.6 45.0 88.1 23.0
1980 40.4 46.5 89.6 26.1
1981 43.8 48.8 90.3 30.7
1982 49.0 53.2 92.9 34.6
1983 49.8 51.0 90.0 40.0
1984 53.7 55.7 89.2 44.5
1985 56.2 58.5 85.7 49.2
1986 58.3 61.2 84.8 52.9
1987 64.3 66.3 88.6 57.7
1988 71.0 73.5 89.2 61.9
1989 82.1 86.4 92.6 67.2
1990 89.6 92.9 93.4 74.2
1991 87.1 91.2 94.1 81.2
1992 95.2 99.3 100.2 90.1
1993 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1994 113.5 110.1 103.6 115.5
1995 134.3 131.2 114.4 132.4
1996 135.1 126.8 111.9 147.8
1997 155.4 145.3 112.4 158.9
1998 161.9 145.3 108.3 174.5
1999 181.1 160.4 103.1 180.7
2000 174.8 156.3 100.7 186.1
2001 174.8 155.9 97.6 197.2
2002 202.2 177.2 100.1 199.6
2003 223.9 190.2 99.2 206.0
Table A.5.  Index Numbers of Output and Inputs - 
All-India Aggregates1














1970-71 13.1 14.9 15.2
1971-72 13.7 15.8 16.6
1972-73 14.8 16.7 18.5
1973-74 17.5 18.5 21.2
1974-75 22.6 24.9 25.7
1975-76 23.2 26.5 26.0
1976-77 23.5 26.2 26.6
1977-78 24.9 27.4 27.2
1978-79 25.8 28.2 27.3
1979-80 29.2 33.0 32.8
1980-81 33.2 37.6 39.1
1981-82 38.2 41.4 41.1
1982-83 41.1 43.3 42.6
1983-84 44.2 45.4 45.2
1984-85 46.7 48.0 48.3
1985-86 50.9 52.3 51.2
1986-97 53.5 54.8 53.1
1987-88 56.9 57.6 57.0
1988-89 61.9 63.1 62.3
1989-90 66.1 68.2 69.3
1990-91 72.1 73.4 75.2
1991-92 81.1 83.0 83.6
1992-93 90.4 92.6 92.8
1993-94 100.0 100.0 100.0
1994-95 111.4 108.4 112.3
1995-96 120.8 118.0 122.0
1996-97 128.8 121.6 124.4
1997-98 137.4 125.2 128.1
1998-99 144.9 128.9 133.6
1999-00 152.6 132.1 137.2
2000-01 165.3 141.2 141.7
2001-02 171.8 145.9 144.3
2002-03 178.4 149.0 148.1
2003-04 188.7 153.1 156.5
Table A.6.  Indices of Output and Intermediate Input Prices
1  Divisia index; author's estimate










Kashmir Kerala Karnataka Maharashtra
Madhya 







1970 0.990 0.952 0.996 1.097 1.040 1.036 0.756 1.022 0.992 1.140 0.987 0.853 1.054 0.928 1.021 0.970 1.025
1971 0.975 0.927 0.990 1.058 1.062 1.248 0.815 1.023 1.026 1.137 0.974 0.829 1.028 0.931 1.008 0.949 1.030
1972 1.034 0.999 1.015 1.100 1.056 0.960 0.886 0.992 1.018 1.161 1.035 0.869 1.046 0.958 1.049 0.981 1.065
1973 1.102 1.098 1.053 1.156 1.072 0.841 0.949 0.996 1.026 1.201 1.102 0.909 1.091 0.993 1.103 1.027 1.114
1974 1.005 1.126 1.052 1.092 1.034 0.726 0.950 0.950 0.949 1.132 1.034 0.818 1.039 0.926 1.058 0.963 1.062
1975 0.995 0.977 0.969 1.013 1.008 0.917 0.817 0.902 0.917 1.076 0.957 0.747 1.015 0.893 0.990 0.988 1.028
1976 1.014 1.062 0.937 1.060 1.058 1.000 0.816 0.933 0.949 1.106 1.015 0.859 1.048 0.930 1.048 1.029 1.059
1977 1.011 1.118 0.925 1.083 1.080 1.058 0.880 0.963 0.955 1.120 0.996 0.844 1.059 0.928 1.066 0.935 1.060
1978 1.022 1.063 0.960 1.074 1.104 1.019 0.982 0.983 1.045 1.145 0.989 0.865 1.088 0.966 1.090 0.956 1.086
1979 0.973 0.993 0.913 1.029 1.034 1.047 0.992 0.964 0.942 1.082 0.966 0.838 1.063 0.941 1.033 0.915 1.033
1980 0.957 0.911 0.866 1.016 1.020 0.975 0.922 0.961 0.911 1.063 0.966 0.785 1.059 0.898 1.025 0.883 1.032
1981 0.991 0.948 0.977 1.047 1.082 1.051 0.982 0.986 0.938 1.092 1.006 0.790 1.081 0.918 1.053 1.041 1.050
1982 1.066 0.987 1.020 1.079 1.114 1.753 1.054 1.016 0.974 1.113 1.038 0.795 1.097 0.922 1.095 1.043 1.080
1983 1.139 1.113 1.120 1.164 1.188 1.635 1.069 1.044 1.054 1.169 1.056 0.850 1.127 1.034 1.126 1.030 1.100
1984 1.140 1.187 1.031 1.130 1.107 1.278 1.128 1.097 1.010 1.172 1.035 0.800 1.125 0.977 1.149 1.027 1.106
1985 1.096 1.208 1.031 1.123 1.105 1.246 1.082 1.069 1.011 1.199 1.075 0.839 1.140 0.982 1.133 1.017 1.110
1986 1.093 1.175 1.027 1.137 1.114 1.199 1.059 1.068 1.021 1.186 1.017 0.868 1.136 1.025 1.138 1.103 1.112
1987 1.076 1.157 1.095 1.159 1.127 1.078 1.105 1.113 1.033 1.190 1.085 0.859 1.172 0.998 1.147 1.128 1.175
1988 1.110 1.090 1.149 1.159 1.140 1.223 1.004 1.103 1.041 1.221 1.086 0.964 1.147 1.008 1.169 1.125 1.110
1989 1.093 1.208 1.126 1.137 1.131 1.096 1.047 1.159 1.073 1.229 1.103 0.978 1.235 1.018 1.180 1.171 1.095
1990 1.144 1.179 1.119 1.160 1.184 1.225 1.110 1.095 1.117 1.256 1.146 0.961 1.196 1.069 1.201 1.177 1.147
1991 1.121 1.137 1.123 1.110 1.158 1.174 1.080 1.135 1.127 1.187 1.082 0.936 1.182 1.041 1.166 1.186 1.129
1992 1.136 1.122 1.107 1.217 1.120 1.126 1.101 1.107 1.129 1.240 1.126 0.927 1.216 1.068 1.163 1.165 1.122
1993 1.159 1.117 1.307 1.236 1.160 1.317 1.278 1.100 1.113 1.296 1.169 0.928 1.219 1.109 1.203 1.195 1.167
1994 1.239 1.148 1.125 1.295 1.233 1.245 1.123 1.139 1.186 1.323 1.188 0.956 1.266 1.188 1.221 1.246 1.175
1995 1.285 1.171 1.163 1.310 1.280 1.231 1.165 1.188 1.168 1.350 1.264 0.978 1.244 1.189 1.220 1.221 1.181
1996 1.251 1.117 1.265 1.316 1.329 1.318 1.169 1.201 1.234 1.333 1.231 0.937 1.318 1.174 1.243 1.283 1.266
1997 1.363 1.176 1.417 1.272 1.331 1.336 1.216 1.238 1.222 1.383 1.281 1.081 1.332 1.287 1.255 1.317 1.342
1998 1.300 1.248 1.380 1.335 1.344 1.335 1.278 1.326 1.219 1.374 1.280 0.974 1.383 1.218 1.278 1.267 1.277
1999 1.347 1.296 1.422 1.367 1.418 1.410 1.358 1.315 1.199 1.443 1.331 1.048 1.444 1.342 1.325 1.297 1.308
2000 1.346 1.191 1.250 1.344 1.388 1.446 1.329 1.316 1.198 1.415 1.343 1.033 1.388 1.324 1.342 1.300 1.318
2001 1.384 1.139 1.239 1.327 1.420 1.465 1.344 1.312 1.240 1.406 1.339 1.022 1.439 1.312 1.319 1.312 1.355
2002 1.416 1.423 1.420 1.399 1.460 1.529 1.380 1.354 1.300 1.464 1.371 1.081 1.460 1.325 1.341 1.363 1.408
2003 1.489 1.500 1.500 1.465 1.485 1.581 1.407 1.396 1.364 1.535 1.447 1.167 1.488 1.370 1.410 1.410 1.469













1970 … … … … …
1971 -4.3 -21.0 … … …
1972 1.1 -2.8 … … …
1973 -7.1 17.2 … … …
1974 3.9 17.2 16.8 5.8 -3.6
1975 -3.4 -8.2 -14.6 -4.5 -5.1
1976 3.8 12.3 19.2 6.6 4.9
1977 1.3 8.6 10.9 6.5 1.1
1978 10.7 16.3 18.9 7.0 1.8
1979 -10.8 -4.2 -4.1 -7.7 -5.1
1980 -11.3 -11.0 -13.9 -4.4 -2.3
1981 6.4 15.6 24.0 9.2 2.5
1982 9.2 14.5 22.3 9.1 2.7
1983 7.0 -4.4 -2.4 -6.6 3.4
1984 -2.2 -1.1 2.0 0.4 -0.4
1985 2.6 -4.4 -14.2 4.7 -0.4
1986 -4.2 -7.6 -9.1 3.4 -0.5
1987 0.8 -1.0 4.7 1.5 1.9
1988 6.9 4.1 5.7 7.2 0.9
1989 … … -6.4 5.3 0.4
1990 … … 6.5 -1.1 1.6
1991 … … -6.0 -11.4 -2.6
1992 … … -19.5 5.9 0.3
1993 … … … … 2.8
1994 … … … … 2.7
1995 … … … … 0.5
1996 … … … … 1.5
1997 … … … … 2.3
1998 … … … … 2.9
1999 … … … … 3.2
2000 … … … … -1.7
2001 … … … … -0.4
2002 … … … … 4.0
2003 … … … … 4.2
Table A.8. TFP and TP Growth Rates Under Different Deflation 
Methods
1   Based on Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan (EPW 1994)
2   Based on Rao (EPW 1996)
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